Before HMS Shropshire became part of the Royal Australian Navy as HMAS Shropshire she was commanded by seven Royal Navy Captains, and one Royal Australian Navy Commander whilst she was undergoing modifications for her refit, prior to commissioning into the RAN on 20 April 1943.

" Mr Norman Makin, the Australian Minister of the Navy, announced the appointment of the first Australian Captain which gave command of the ship to Captain J.A. Collins CB, RAN who joined Shropshire on the 7 April 1943. The ship was formally handed over on 25th June 1943 by Admiral George d'Oyly Lyon, KCB, Commander-in-Chief the NORE.

The Commanding Officers of Shropshire are as follows:

On Commissioning	24 September 1929	- Captain R.W. Oldham CBE, RN
	31 August 1931	- Captain F.A. Buckley RN
	August 1933	- Captain R.V. Holt DS, MVO, RN
	29 November 1934	- Captain W.E.C. Tair MVO, RN
	16 October 1937	- Captain A.W. La-touche Bisset RN
	13 April 1940	- Captain J.H. Edelston RN
	18 April 1941	- Captain J.T. Borrett OBE, RN
	28 December 1942	- Commander D.H. Harries RAN
	7 April 1943	- Captain J.A. Collins CB, RAN
	6 May 1944	- Captain H.A. Showers RAN
	25 September 1944	- Captain C.A.G. Nichols DSO, MVO, RN
	November 1946	- Captain H.J. Buchanan DSO, RAN

 

Officers who served as Flag Officers in Shropshire when she was the Australian Squadron's Flagship are as follows:

Rear-Admiral V.A.C. Crutchley VC, CB, DSC
June 1942 to - June 1944
Flagships - HMAS Australia and HMAS Shropshire
Commodore (1st Class) J.A. Collins CB
June 1944 to 21 October 1944
Flagship - HMAS Australia (left wounded - Leyte Gulf)
Captain C.A.G. Nichols DSO, MVO, RN, (USN Bronze Medal)
October 1944 to December 1944
Flagship - HMAS Shropshire
(Senior Captain commanding the Australian Squadron)
Commodore (1st Class) H.B. Farncomb DSO, MVO
9 December 1944 to 22-Ju1y 1945
Flagships - HMAS Australia, HMAS Shropshire, HMAS Hobart and HMAS Arunta
Rear-Admiral J.A. Collins CB
23 July 1945 to 7 November 1946
Flagship - HMAS Shropshire and HMAS Hobart
(Occupation forces Tokyo Bay and Signing of Peace)
Rear-Admiral H.B. Farncomb CB, DSO, MVO
November 1946 to May 1947
Flagships - HMAS Shropshire, HMAS Australia and HMAS Hobart
(HMAS Shropshire placed in reserve commission 30 May 1947 )

Later both Rear-Admiral V.A.C. Crutchley and Commodore J.A. Collins were knighted and retired as Admiral Sir Victor Crutchley VC, KCB, CB, DSC and Vice-Admiral Sir John Collins KBE, CB, and Commodore Farncomb retired as Rear-Admiral Harold B. Farncomb CB, DSO, MVO.

At this point one should go back to the early years and give a brief resume of her origin, peacetime and wartime history until she was commissioned in the RAN in 1943.

Shropshire, a London class cruiser, was 'bought' during a 'Warship Week' contribution by the people of the Shropshire County (population 260 900) they raised the magnificent sum of £2 345 218 and when the Prime Minister, Mr Churchill, on behalf of the British Government offered and transferred unconditionally the cruiser on 9 August 1942 to the Australian Government, to replace the ill-fated Canberra, it was indeed considered fitting to retain the name and her identity with the people of the County of Shropshire:

At the time it had been intended to rename her Canberra. However, the United States Navy had already decided to build a heavy cruiser and to commemorate the name by calling their ship the USS Canberra, in 1943. Both His Majesty the King and the Australian Government's Prime Minister, Mr John Curtin approved the retention of the name. Shropshire's peacetime career commenced when she joined the 1st Cruiser Squadron as a unit of the Mediterranean Fleet in 1929 and she served in the Mediterranean Fleet until the outbreak of World War II on 3 September 1939.

During this time she returned to Chatham, England, to be paid off in 1932.
Recommissioned and paid off in 1934. Recomissioned, refitted in 1937, and after four months became the flagship of Rear-Admiral J.D.H. Cunningham CB, MVO until the 25 May 1939.

During her attachment to the Mediterranean Fleet, 1st Cruiser Squadron she participated actively by patrolling the sea lanes and giving protective cover if needed to our own merchant fleet during the Abyssinian War of 1935-36 and spending many disturbing days arranging to evacuate refugees from Barcelona during the Spanish Civil War, also in 1936.

She was at the mighty display at the Silver Jubilee Review on 16 July 1935 showing the power and size of the British Navy at the review by King George V in the Royal Yacht Victoria and Albert at Spithead.

In 1938 on passage to Marseilles she came upon the Danish vessel Bodil which was attacked and sunk by an unknown aircraft. Shropshire closed at full speed and picked up the Bodil's crew and took them to safety.

When launched in 1929 the ladies of the County subscribed for a silk ensign for the ship whilst the gentlemen presented the ship with silver plate which consisted of five silver salvers, three silver cups with covers and one silver inkstand for the captain's cabin. Lastly, a cabinet gramophone was presented for use by the crew. A plaque was also received which recorded the adoption of the ship by the Shropshire County in 'Warship Week' in 1942.

A ceremonial inspection of the Guard of Honour formed by the only Sea Cadet Unit in Shropshire from the training ship Wrekin preceded the handing over of these plaques and silver plate to Mr S.M. Bruce, High Commissioner for Australia by The Right Honourable The Earl of Powis, Lord Lieutenant of the County at Shrewsbury Castle on 30 August 1945.

Further very active war patrols occurred in the South Atlantic when Shropshire was attached to Force 'H', and ordered to search for the German pocket Battleship Graf Spee in the South Atlantic as well as in the Indian Ocean.

One might say thankfully a successful but unsuccessful search occurred during those few but very eventful days in December 1939 in which Graf Spee was finally caught and attacked and then scuttled at Montevideo after the Battle of the River Plate. Shropshire also served in the North Sea with the Russian convoys including tours of duty in the Denmark Strait and northern Norwegian waters, and carrying out bombardments during allied landings on the coast of Italian Somaliland at Mogadishu and Kismaya in support of the South African Army.
These actions spelled the end of the Italian Empire in East Africa.

Before Shropshire was handed over to the Royal Australian Navy she had served a fairly eventful life in many theatres of war and other just as dangerous areas. To recap, she served in the North Sea, Red Sea, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, North Atlantic Ocean, South Atlantic Ocean and the Arctic Ocean.

At one stage Shropshire took over the escort of the convoy carrying troops of the Ninth Australian Division embarked on the liners Aquitania and Nieuw Zeeland during their passage across the Indian Ocean leaving 3rd January 1941 from Fremantle to Colombo to the Middle East through Suez Canal. Other troopships in the convoy were the liners Queen Mary, Mauretania, Dominion, Monarch and the Awatea.

An additional piece of information which I am sure will be of interest to all is that the Patron-in-Chief of our HMAS Canberra and HMAS Shropshire Association'. HRH Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh was at one time a member of Shropshire's ship's company.

As reported he was a little known Greek Prince when he fought in World War II. He went to sea as a midshipman in 1940 serving in the battleship Ramillies and later in the heavy cruisers Kent and Shropshire and in the battleship Valiant. Whilst in Shropshire he served in the area named the 'East Indies Station', carrying out searching and escorting duties. Later in the Indian Ocean, early 1941, Shropshire took part in the bombardment of Italian Somaliland, playing a large part in defeating the Italian Forces.

According to Chief Petty Officer Fred Simpson, a crew member of Shropshire at the time, the Prince was in the main a well-liked young officer, not averse to showing his annoyance if there were signs of being overprotected by senior officers when danger seemed imminent. He was always to the forefront trying to be involved in action areas but rarely, if at all, succeeding.

Fred also relates the frightening day when Shropshire registered a 45 degree roll (according to the swing of the pendulum situated midships) and the crew found themselves standing on the ship's side to retain balance. Frank Sinclair ex HMS Shropshire also relates to these early days in the Indian Ocean.

After the refit and presentation to the Australian Government Shropshire arrived safely in Australia despite threats by Dr Goebbels, the German Nazi Party Chief propagandist, that she would never survive the voyage even though some attempts had been made to carry out the threat according to the German Communications network Reuter.

From her first commissioning to her handing over to the Royal Australian Navy Shropshire had steamed more than 364,000 sea miles of which 220 000 had been steamed from the outbreak of war in September 1939 until December 1942. So to compare peacetime movements at 14,000 sea miles per year things certainly became more hectic during the first three (3) years of the war at 70,000 sea miles steamed each year.

During the victory tour to England a plaque made of Shropshire oak surmounted by the county's Coat of Arms and suitably engraved, was placed on the ship's quarterdeck. It commemorated the adoption of the ship by the county in 1929 and the inscription read as follows:

'This plaque which had been engraved before HMS Shropshire was transferred to the Royal Australian Navy, together with pieces of silver plate presented to the ship on her first commission in the Royal Navy, was on 30 August 1945, at Shrewsbury Castle, Shropshire, handed by the Right Honourable, the Earl of Powis, HM Lieutenant of Shropshire, to the Right Honourable SM Bruce, High Commissioner for the Commonwealth of Australia in token of the continued interest of the people of Shropshire and of their wish that these gifts should remain with the ship in perpetuity'

I do not intend telling the whole story about the sinking of our heavy cruiser Canberra. However this tragic loss did give the RAN the chance to receive the most up-to-date equipment available fitted to this magnificent gift of Shropshire an 8 '' gun heavy cruiser of the London class.

HMAS Canberra (Savo)
HMAS Canberra, on the 7 and 8 August l 942 was a unit of the US Task Force 44, under the flag of Rear-Admiral V.A.C. Crutchley VC, CB, MVO in Australia, was covering the US landings at Guadalcanal and Tulagi in the Solomon Group of Islands. On Sunday morning at 0138 on 9 August 1942, just off Savo Island the Japanese fleet under Vice-Admiral Mikawa swept in and annihilated the allied fleet sinking four 8'' gun heavy cruisers Canberra and USS Vincennes, Quincy and Astoria

The Japanese fleet consisted of five heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and one destroyer. The US/Australian fleet, divided into three main groups Southern, Northern and Eastern, consisted of six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and eight destroyers. Another four destroyers patrolling some distance away and two destroyers were deployed as a radar screen patrol.

Even today many people are unaware of why the Shropshire gift relates to the sinking of the Canberra. Many of the ship's company were not in the navy when the Savo battle occurred. I will try in my own style of explanation to outline the Battle. It will be divided briefly into four parts: So to give a resumé of happenings of the sinking and to allow some objectivity in deciding who was to blame:- (The following is my research into the fateful action of Before, During and After the Savo Island Battle.)

The Participants in the battle of Savo are as follows:
The Japanese Fleet under Vice-Admiral Mikawa consisted of : 5 heavy cruisers - Chokai, Aoba, Kako, Kinugasa, Furutaka; 2 light cruisers: Tenryu, Yubari; 1 destroyer - Yunagi

The United States/Australian Forces consisted of six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and eight destroyers under Rear-Admiral Crutchley VC, RN, were split into three groups protecting the following areas:
Southern	HMAS Australia	Heavy cruiser (8'') (Flag)
	HMAS Canberra	Heavy cruiser (8")
	USS Chicago	Heavy cruiser (8")
	USS Patterson	Destroyer
	USS Bagley	Destroyer
Northern	USS Vincennes	Heavy cruiser (8")
	USS Quincy	Heavy cruiser (8")
	USS Astoria	Heavy cruiser (8")
	USS Helm	Destroyer
	USS Wilson	Destroyer
Eastern	USS San Juan	Light cruiser (6")
	HMAS Hobart	Light cruiser (6")
	USS Monssen	Destroyer
	USS Buchanan	Destroyer
As well as a Western Patrol
	USS Blue	Destroyer
	USS Ralph Talbot	Destroyer
	*USS Selfridge	Destroyer
	*USS Ellet	Destroyer
	*USS Henley	Destroyer
	*USS Jarvis	Destroyer
*Apparently arrived later? I could not confirm if they were patrolling etc during the action and at or near Savo at the time of the battle

The before factors which could have affected the outcome:
On 7 August 1942 A USS submarine at 2000 hours	reported Japanese fleet 550 mites away. Admirals Turner and Crutchley were not worried and took no action.
On 8 August 1942
1026	First RAAF Hudson bomber sighted and immediately reported enemy force but because of indecisive description of ships, allied ships took no action.
1404	Second RAAF Hudson landed and confirmed enemy cruiser force. Admirals Turner and Crutchley assumed enemy was only making for Rekata Bay to set up a seaplane base.
2032	Admiral Turner called Admiral Crutchley for consultation and Admiral Crutchley left in flagship HMAS Australia to visit. Captain Bode, Chicago, and Senior Captain Remaining, Captain Riefkohl, Vincennes, not advised by Admiral Crutchley of his departure.
2313	Japanese spotter plane flew over and because it was showing navigation lights ignored by all ships. Japanese fleet now 90 miles away.
2400	Admiral Crutchley left Admiral Turner, and at
0115
On 9 August 1942	Returned to Australia
0130	Australia patrolled the area near landing ships. Neither Admiral Turner nor Admiral Crutchley were advised of the spotter plane. However, at
0150	they saw flares and just prior to this at
0145	San Juan and Hobart also saw flares. However, prior to Admiral Crutchley arriving on board Australia the following had already occurred:
What occurred during the actual battle:
On 9 August 1942
0054	Japanese fleet passed the two US destroyers on screen unseen by ship's crew or detected by radar.
0138	Japanese fired torpedoes and guns.
0143	Canberra hit by twenty-four 8" shells and two torpedoes? (85 killed and 55 wounded).
0147	Chicago hit by a torpedo (2 killed).
0150	Astoria hit by hail of 8" shells. Astoria returned fire and hit Japanese cruiser and flagship Chokai (38 killed and 48 wounded). Astoria lost (216 dead and 186 wounded).
0150	Quincy hit by hail of shells and torpedoed. (370 dead and 166 wounded) returned fire (no hits).
0150	Vincennes hit by shells and torpedoes. (332 dead and 258 wounded) returned fire and hit Heavy Cruiser Kinugasa ( l killed and 1 wounded)
0220	Ralph Talbot hit (22 casualties)
0223	Japanese fleet retired to the north.
0235	Quincy capsized and sank bow first.
0250	Rear-Admiral Crutchley learnt of damage.
0345	Vincennes rolled over on beam ends and sank.
0430	Chicago returned and fired on Patterson. (Which was assisting Canberra.)
0800	Canberra, a burning wreck sunk by allied gunfire from the Destroyers Selfridge and Ellet (300 shells and 5 torpedoes) because of navigational dangers if left as a floating hulk.
1215	Astoria sank - her forward 5'' magazine exploded and made a hole beneath the waterline.
Total Dead	Japanese 111	No ships lost
	USA/Australia 1024	4 ships lost.
	and 709 wounded

It was an Allied victory in the author's opinion, in the total scene, because the Japanese failed to realise they had the troops landing at Guadalcanal at their mercy, and after the conclusions and findings:- To conclude, Admiral Mikawa, the Japanese Fleet Admiral retired north thinking he had completed a great action and victory. However, he in turn was severely criticised for not attacking the troop-landing ships and supply ships whilst he had them at a disadvantage and allowing the US Marines to occupy Guadalcanal without further threat. Admirals Turner and Crutchley were criticised for their shortcomings - but diplomacy ruled and they remained on active service in their respective battle areas.

Admirals Fletcher and Ghormley were relieved.
Captain Riefkohl was relieved and lost his sea command Vincennes.
Captain Bode committed suicide after losing his sea command Chicago - Chicago became 'lost' in the action.

The Australian Navy Board's findings on the sinking of HMAS Canberra

1. Admiral Crutchley left in HMAS Australia the flagship and should have used a destroyer to visit Admiral Turner and did not advise the senior Captain.

2. Failure of ships to receive Patterson's warnings because of high radio noise level.

3. Canberra not in state of readiness and guns not loaded.

4. Damage caused by gunfire not torpedoes.

5. Flooding magazine contributed to listing of ship.

6. Frequent changing of ship's complement caused inefficiencies.

7. Admiral Crutchley disagreed and claimed that Canberra was hit by torpedoes because damage was consistent with a torpedo attack.

As well as taking into account the Navy Board's findings above, it could also be said that the sinking of Canberra was one of the needless tragedies of naval warfare at that time, and could/should have been avoided!

Firstly, the RAAF aerial reconnaissance had sighted the Japanese cruiser force the previous day, but incorrect reporting of the type of enemy ships, and delay in forwarding the advice, did not receive the prompt attention required.

Secondly, two radar-equipped American destroyers patrolling off Savo Island, inexplicably failed to detect the enemy ships and yet the Japanese sighted and avoided both picquet destroyers.

Thirdly, the American Rear-Admiral in command of the entire operation decided that unless Canberra could be made ready to steam within a specified time limit, she was to be abandoned and destroyed. However, had more time been given to raise steam and due consideration to towing her out, Canberra may well have been saved. But according to others below decks the ship was an inferno and the decks were so hot to walk on that it would have been impossible to raise steam and get underway.

As a final comment, as this latter directive to destroy was executed, it was found impossible to sink Canberra by gunfire alone, due to her fine stability although slightly contradictory to the statement No 5 and subdivision and ultimately she had to be torpedoed. On the 20 August, 1942, the loss of Canberra was announced simultaneously by the Australian Prime Minister, Mr John Curtin, and the Allied Commander-in-Chief, SW Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur.

Mr Curtin was to say,

'By their devotion to duty the men of HMAS Canberra have made the greatest and noblest sacrifice for their country.'

Canberra had served faithfully for fourteen years and was Australia's largest warship lost in the war.

So from the above reportings it is quite clear that truth is a difficult thing to perceive when all concerned are making sure their own backs are protected 'first'. From my own 'reading' of the stories and comments heard, the whole situation was to say the least 'a disgraceful and shameful action which most would like to ignore'. However this battle at Savo Island does not reflect on the ship's companies of the four heavy cruisers sunk and in our case HMAS Canberra. G.H. Gill's statement in the RAN in World War II that she was sunk without firing a shot has been disputed. One book said 4" shells were fired and Max Farrell says he heard a 4" gun fire - certainly the main armament was put out of action with the loss of power when she was hit by the first hail of 8" shells, so they were not fired even though the barrels were trained and not fore and aft as some have claimed.