The Third Battle Tour

Always on Active Service

On 30 June 1944 we sailed to Seeadler Harbour carrying with us four officers, eleven ratings and twelve AIF servicemen as passengers. On the way north we closed up for a pre-arranged HA shoot, just off Cape Moreton. However it was cancelled because of poor visibility and low cloud and the towing plane ordered to return to base. It did not prevent one of 'guns' successful 8'' full calibre shoots taking place at a battle practice target whilst travelling at 22 knots.

The next day Captain Showers ordered Commander (E) Armitage to prepare for a full power trial to test the newly repaired, but previously failed defective, feed pump. This time the trial was successful and our 14 000 ton fully loaded ship surged through the water for one hour at just over 30 knots. At the entrance to China Strait we stopped in Milne Bay for one hour to discharge and embark mails, stores and personnel to and from HMA Tug Wato. Nine ratings were disembarked and forty-seven taken on board for passage to various ships.

Shropshire arrived on 5 July 1944 at Seeadler Harbour passing through the new anti-submarine boom installed by the Americans. We refuelled and stayed alongside the tanker Leopard awaiting the arrival of Australia wearing the Broad Pendant of Commodore Collins. The Americans were also very busy assembling a huge floating dock capable of taking the largest ship afloat at that time.

On 7 July 1944 the captain cleared lower deck to read the Regulations relating to censorship, particularly referring to the impending battles ahead of us. This was the first indication of getting very close to the ongoing never- ceasing actions that were about to take place - eg, every morning at 0600 flights of Liberators were leaving for target areas and returning during the afternoon. To put it into the words of Lieutenant-Commander Bracegirdle, 'We were entering the 'Tiger' Country'. On 12 July 1944 the Task Force sailed for the first action on this tour, to Aitape in support of the US 6th Army.

Aitape
On the 14th we moved west towards Wewak area and bombarded Sowam after a Squadron of Beauforts and Marauders had bombed the target and they in turn spotted for our fall of shot for this short engagement. We commenced firing at 0802 1/2 and ceased 0821, expending sixty-six rounds of 8'', returning to Aitape to anchor at 1700.

On Sunday 16 July 1944 we enjoyed a Rosalind Russell/Clark Gable movie 'They Met in Bombay'. Thankfully the rain held off because during the afternoon watch and dogs it bucketed down. Shropshire moved out west from Aitape on 17 July to bombard a target area NIAP escorted by the US Destroyer Bache as our A/S screen.

We opened fire on three occasions 1421-1434; 1559-1600 and 1601-1655 and expended thirty rounds of 8''. RAAF Beauforts of 71 Wing also bombed close by on Cape D'Jerven and afterwards spotted our fall of shot, reporting that all areas were well covered. On the 18th we replenished ammunition from the Poyang, as HMAS Bunbury and the USS Beale entered harbour.

Yakamul
Captain Showers was advised by Captain Calder AIF, our Army liaison officer, that he had received orders from General Krueger of the US 6th Army that two areas at Yakamul required our gunfire attention. Shropshire was assigned the target area in which the enemy command HQ was sited and even though a small target, it was a very important task.

We opened fire at 0803 on 20 July 1944 and ceased at 0835, expending ninety-two 8'' rounds in a deliberate bombardment plan formulated by Lieutenant-Commander Bracegirdle and assisted by an aircraft spotter, the spotter was a 71 Wing Beaufort pilot/observer. We returned to Aitape Harbour to hear that reports indicated the Japanese troops would attack the Aitape perimeter. All the ships were to be anchored at their respective bombardment anchor berths and in readiness for day or night action to support the Army at a few minutes notice.

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On 22 July 1944 the commodore transferred his broad pendant to Shropshire whilst Australia and Warramunga without popular RC Sin Bos'n Cocky Roche aboard headed south for a much needed refit leaving via Milne Bay for Sydney. With the commodore's team, came Commanders Gatacre, Storey and Leitch - at 1300 the CTF 74's flag was hoisted. These changes when the ship becomes the flagship means a fair amount of shuffling of cabins and offices and some crowding, so while it is essential and necessary, not everybody is amused - particularly those lower down in the pecking order.

The commodore received a congratulatory message from the Commanding General of the US 6th Army, General Krueger commenting on Task Force 74's splendid performance in support of the ground forces during the Aitape operation. A general comment from our very keen spotting plane observers was that even our 8'' bursts were often swallowed up in the dense jungle and it was suggested that each broadside contain one round of white phosphorus or smoke to facilitate the role of these eager but untrained plane spotters to see our fall of shot. Additionally it was mentioned that Beauforts were not the most suitable plane to use. They were too fast but did an excellent job.

On the 24th, a calamity occurred - we lost our thirty-six foot pinnace when it broached in the surf at Aitape. Whilst this drama was unfolding and the Aitape perimeter was under threat from the Japanese troops, a US PT boat thankfully patrolled to protect the men ashore trying to salvage the boat.

It was considered a total wreck. In sharp contrast to the USN when a piece of war equipment is lost, the RAN took a different stance. Commodore Collins directed that a 'Hearing' be undertaken. It commenced at 0920 on the 27th, ceasing at 1600, the Board consisted of Arunta's captain, Commander A.E. Buchanan, president; Shropshire, Commander A.S. Storey; and Arunta's engineer officer Lieutenant-Commander (E) E.P. Liddell with Shropshire's writer C.H. Curtis as the shorthand writer.

After seventeen witnesses were heard the decision was taken to admonish those in charge of the pinnace as well as the officer in charge of the recreation party and questioning those responsible for maintenance of Shropshire's motor boats as well as the role taken by those assisting in the salvage.

Having been on duty during the hearing, it was obvious that experience was in short supply in handling this sort of mishap in that a request to the coxswain from an RAAF officer going ashore to put him aboard the LST (in a swell), the engine catching fire, then shut down, the boat filling with water. The boat had no power, and steerage way was lost. The final upshot, because of slow reaction, to use the twenty-five men available to hold the boat in the surf and prevent the thumping, plus the final destructive act of placing a chain on the stem post ring and pulling the stem out by a US bulldozer, sealed the pinnace's future. This calamity was an unforgettable lesson because in these circumstances it was usual to run the tow rope completely around the gunwale and across the transom before pulling the boat on to the beach, stem first. The conclusion to this mishap was a request for and Arunta's unsuccessful attempt to salvage the remains of the equipment from the wrecked pinnace - a futile and somewhat too late exercise.

We returned to Hollandia on 25 July 1944 to refuel and take on stores in readiness for the operation 'Globetrotter'. On the opposite side of the tanker was berthed a large US hospital ship which was in contravention of the Geneva Convention in that no hospital ship is to anchor in close proximity to vessels of war. At 2000 the hospital ship left for sea in an unforgettable 'blaze of lights' as opposed to our continued blackout.

Once again the delivery of mail was disappointing and as Captain Showers pointed out to the Naval Board regular first-class mail service is essential to maintaining good morale. The Captain also advised that health and conduct of the ship's company was satisfactory. He commented that since commissioning, the sick bay staff had carried out its fourth and fifth appendectomies during this month of July 1944. On the 28 rejoined with TF 75 to form TF 78 to cover the landings during the occupation of the Cape Sansapor Area. TF 74 consisted of Shropshire (flag), Arunta, Hutchins, Bache, Beale, Ammen.

We arrived at Mios Woendi Island anchorage just south of Biak on the 30th and took on fresh provisions. Three air-raid warnings were given during this time, one of which was detected at thirty miles and we seemed to be constantly closing up for action stations. During this operation no bombardments took place and little or no opposition was encountered by the troops being landed, although our radar picked up a large group of bogeys approaching at 280 knots from the west. A flight of twenty-four Lightning fighters flew overhead to investigate. Action stations was called but no attack developed and the all clear given once again but we stood by at short notice to support the troop landings but nothing eventuated.

More radar reports of bogeys were recorded whilst at anchor in Mios Woendi Island anchorage - one of them being friendly aircraft. It was an emergency landing by a Catalina flying boat. Lieutenant Ken Stock was given the task of finding our mail and left aboard a taxi-barge at 0800 to call on the port director Sevido Dock near Bosnik aerodrome but returned at 1745 to report an unsuccessful search, two days later two bags of mail arrived.

In the meantime, on 2 August 1944 it was arranged for a group of sailors to try their hand at fishing ashore. The result was a few hundred pounds of fish and a most welcome change of diet. Midshipman J.H. Malcolm came on board on the 2nd to experience his first red alert and closing up at action stations. We left for Seeadler Harbour on 3 August 1944 arriving on the 5th with Nashville and four destroyers in company to receive five more bags of mail.

On Saturday the 5th we saw the film 'The King Steps Out' and on Sunday the 6th the film 'The Pied Piper'. Two nights of light fantasy to take our minds off the tasks ahead. On the 7th Len Burgess, assistant painter and his boss painter (D. Kinsella) were pleased to say no 'paint ship' due to heavy rain - but our joy was short-lived and everybody was hard at it during the afternoon watch. We saw HMS Ariadne a British fast minelayer enter harbour on the 7th, whilst a Board of Inquiry was held on 10 August 1944 in Shropshire from 0940 to 1515 regarding an incident on board the Fairmile ML 827.

The Officer Commanding the US 7th Fleet, Admiral Kinkaid, came on board on Wednesday 9 August 1944 to speak to the commodore and look over Shropshire. HMAS Gascoyne entered harbour on the 10th with draftees for other ships, one able seaman for Shropshire. We weighed anchor ond the 14th returning on 15th after some 4" gun, close range weapons, torpedo firing and star shell exercises with Ariadne and Taylor.

It was about this time that our new chief sick berth Petty Officer Jim Ralston was given his baptism of fire by having a damage control exercise sprung on him. The Commander, well-known for his somewhat lukewarm enthusiasm regarding the efficiency and effectiveness of rookies, decided to try him out. He survived due to advance advice received from 'friends' at sea. Although highly suspicious the Commander had accepted the success of Jim Ralston and his team of SBAs including Trevor Smart, A. Thomas and Wally Grant (D) in handling the pressure placed upon them.

Just as an aside, the story of Chief Ralston's attempt to find Shropshire is interesting in light of his 'Cook's Tour' in chasing all over the South West Pacific to catch his ship. He left Huon on the 1 July 1944 proceeding to Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane, 'Sausage Train' to Townsville Oonoonba Camp, HT Canberra to Port Moresby, Milne Bay. Left Milne Bay 25/ 7/44 on board HMAS Euchuca (after seeking help from Lieutenant Commander Alliston) to Langemak, Maukaua, Tuefi, Buna, transferred to barge for RAN camp 543 at Salamaua, thence on board HMAS Rockhampton 27/7/44 passing Madang, Wewak, Aitape arriving Hollandia then to Biak - no Shropshire in sight. Transferred to ammunition ship Po Yang with 5000 tons of ammunition aboard and then experienced a Jap air raid to scare him on his first night aboard.

Left for Hollandia on 7 August 1944 still aboard Po Yang and then transferred to MV Merkur on the 13th, finally to go on board Shropshire on 16/8/44. What a transfer ordeal, forty-seven days of frustration, boredom, moments of fear and finally to look upon his ship with his own thoughts of 'she looked great'. Apart from this frustrating period, Chief Ralston with his sick berth staff-was asked by the Senior Medical Officer, Commander H.W. Gault, to prepare a report and take action to recognise the first aid and temporary medical stations because he knew changes were required, as we were now heading into the most dangerous time of this war - into the tiger country of the Philippines.

After discussing with the other Medical Officers, Lieutenant Commanders McKenzie, Campbell, Lieutenants Kerr-Grant, Cameron and Bradley, the Chief set up first aid boxes in the quartermaster's lobby, bakery, and torpedo workshop; first aid tins in A, B, X, Y turrets; A, B, X, Y shell rooms; fore and after controls; ADM sea cabin flat; ADP; after director; fore bridge; HA guns - port and starboard; port and starboard pompoms; fore and after magazines, A and B boiler rooms; fore and after engine rooms as well as providing stretchers.

The contents of the boxes and tins varied and were checked constantly for stability and quantity of medical requirements as well as the quality of bandages, dressings, etc. The sick bay being the main station as well as the converted ward room manned by surgeons and senior sick berth personnel would carry out major operations in the event of the ship being hit whilst the other stations, the office flat, cafeteria, recreation space (canteen) were equipped and manned by sick berth attendants to carry out minor nursing requirements. These being the areas of main medical care did not preclude Chief Ralston from rememberering that our sixty-six Carley floats were to be stocked with first aid kits.

While closing up to action stations was becoming a constant task for the whole ship's company our sick bay medical team were always at the ready - eg when action stations sounded, all medical cupboards were unlocked, and checked, operating tables including emergency operating tables cleared away and necessary associated gear erected and trolleys secured nearby.

We can all say, because we were possibly a 'lucky ship' with well trained gunnery crews, their services were never needed apart from the daily medical requirements for the sick and injured. We should not forget our dental services provided by Lieutenants L.F. Colton and G.L Homewood, and our mechanic P.O.R. Gibbins who on more than a few occasions made us comfortable with the help of Wally Grant the Dental SBA and SAB (D) Bob Smithwick.

Chief Ralston was later to be nicknamed 'Blue Bag' because he asked sailors being bitten by sea lice whilst swimming to bring their 'Reckitts Blue' with them to place on the swelling. This not only worked to ease the pain but resulted in the nickname sticking for the remainder of his service in Shropshire.

The commodore had two guests on board on the 15th and 16th to talk over our next main action at Morotai as well as conducting a tour of inspection during their visit. They were US General Chase and the Carrier Force Admiral.

During the next two weeks we continued with a multitude of exercises, fire-fighting on a pontoon, 8'' and 4" gunnery with fighter direction exercises as well as close range weapons firings at sleeve targets. We saw the film 'Sergeant York' during a heavy downpour. Several star shell shoots, dummy torpedo attacks, refueling from the oiler Bishopdale, storing ship, getting out our life rafts, a fire in the blacksmith shop (just abaft the bridge on the upper deck) as well as closing up for a few aircraft red alerts which turned out to be friendly and, of course, the never ending radar tracking of all ships and aircraft in our area as well as a few night encounter exercises and tactical drills. We were busy sailors but we did see another film 'Reunion in France'.

Because of the impracticability of sendinmg Po Yang to Seeadler, Shropshire sailed to Humboldt Bay to effect the changing of our 4'' gun barrels. This occurred on the 24th and was completed on the 26th. Our gunnery officers and ordnance people were very busy, particularly as it left the ship short of long range A/A guns in case of attack.

Shropshire joined and passed many ships during this period including the hospital ship Tasman, HMAS Katoomba, Bendigo, Hawkesbury, Ararat, as well as the new battleship USS New Jersey, Rio Grande, Buchanan, Epping Forest, Gunston Hall, Cape Esperance, Dashiell, Eldon, Swanson, Wright, Edmonds, Nicholas and our own task force cruisers and destroyers. Always animpressive sight and a feeling of wellbeing knowing they were on our side and not the enemy's.

Changes of ship's company personnel also occurred: Sub-Lieutenant Ransom joined, (Midshipman) Francis rejoined, Sub-Lieutenant Moon joined and on 2 September 1944 Commodore Collins' Broad Pendant was struck and transferred to Australia.

The night before a wardroom party was well under way and created some very sore heads the next day when the game of 'musical chairs' of cabin changing, etc commenced, much to some of the junior officers' relief. The gun room was really overcrowded and to some, living conditions were worse than for the sailors because they could not shakedown anywhere as the lower deck ratings could and did.

On 9 September 1944 Commodore Collins called the captains of the two heavy cruisers and four destroyers for a conference to discuss the Morotai operation and afterwards proceeded to Humboldt Bay with TF 75 joining and checking the IFF equipment. They took part in tracking exercises to finally refuel, provision, before anchoring and finding there were at least thirty-six fleet tankers and six aircraft carriers in harbour, so things were certainly building up. We left Humboldt Bay on 11 September 1944 for our designated bombardment areas and apart from SG radar tracking exercises, as well as using optical rangefinders, the only excitement was closing up for an unidentified bogey. Our escort carrier planes providing anti-submarine patrols intercepted the bogey, a lone Liberator bomber.

Whilst closed up at dawn action stations on the 12th Captain Showers spoke to the crew advising them of the Morotai attack to take place at 0700 on the 15 September 1944 and to expect heavy opposition. We were now within 275 miles of the Philippines as we joined with LSI's Manoora, Kanimbla and Troopship Wasatch and about sixty small craft - LCIs and LSTs. Altogether - 110 ships and 17 000 troops took part, (including 2 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, 6 aircraft carriers, 35 destroyers and 8 frigates).

Morotai - Point Gila
At 0445 all hands were called, coffee and soup issued, then action stations at 0530. The previous day the gunnery officer, Warwick Bracegirdle, issued his orders for all 8'' turrets, 4" A/A guns, as well as all CRW guns and lookouts to watch for aircraft coming in from the sun sector, and directed that all 8" guns be prepared immediately after bombardments to load for barrage firing.

The patrolling ceased as did our 0610 breakfast at our action stations (boiled eggs), whilst at 0700 Ammen, Mullaney opened fire. Warramunga followed suit and destroyed two barges but not before the Japs had moved inland.

Shropshire opened fire at 0718 ceasing at 0741 after firing a total of 161(8") rounds at our targets Able and Baker, as well as being on alert for a primary target of knocking out shore batteries if necessary. On completion, and the expected opposition being a non event, we moved to sea to patrol, awaiting further action requests before returning to Mios Woendi at a speed of 14.5 knots. This allowed the bombers to move in to destroy any future and possible Japanese resistance.

Because both Shropshire and Australia were stationary during the action, Arunta and Warramunga protected us by conducting an anti-submarine patrol. During the bombardment we had to cease firing twice on the advice of our spotting plane from Nashville because our 8'' shell fragments were endangering the destroyer Fletcher and subsequently this, plus the early ceasefire, prevented us using all of 240 allotted 8" shells.

We arrived at Mios Woendi at 0720 on the 18th to refuel and anchor, and to greet our new skipper, Captain C.A.G. Nichols, MVO, RN who stepped off a PT boat at 1830 to come on board. The Po Yang came alongside and early next morning at 0530 we ammunitioned ship, and embarked other supplies during the afternoon watch from MV Merkur. The 'buzz' as usual was incorrect. We were not heading for Sydney - only Captain H.A. Showers was to be the lucky one. He handed over to Captain Nichols and left on 25 September 1944 at 0730 aboard a PT boat. His was a very short but happy stay on Shropshire and I am sure he would not forget the loud cheers from all ranks as the PT boat pulled away to take him ashore for his passage by lane to Sydney.

Captain Nichols cleared lower deck and spoke to the ship's company next morning at 0900, after being invited to dine with the officers in the wardroom the night before. Our mail was being held at Manus in the Admiraltys, much to the disgust of the crew, however, it was admitted that the 'powers to be' were trying.

The commodore's intention to practice ship towing and refuelling was cancelled as we were ordered to proceed to Manus. While underway at 15 knots, radar tracking of aircraft from the US cruisers was successfully carried out as well as testing the IFF equipment and having another of those very necessary night encounter exercises. The following day surface and range finder tracking was carried out but the sleeve firing shoots were cancelled due to poor weather.

On 29 September 1944 we arrived at Manus, where Lieutenant J.W. Folk joined, but no mail because it had been sent to Biak by air. We refuelled from the oiler Leopard and surveyed the harbour to find one of the largest battle fleets we had ever seen - the US 3rd Fleet consisting of 8 battleships, 10 aircraft carriers, 25 cruisers, 50 destroyers as well as many fleet tankers and other craft.

It rained all day Saturday 30 September 1944, but one bright spark during the day was the manner in which Lieutenant-Commander Alliston brought Warramunga alongside at 1040. She slid alongside practically scraping the paint off both ships, engines full astern, stop engines, out went the lines, springs, secured - bloody marvellous - he was a magnificent ship handler. Some of us felt like clapping. We lost (temporarily) Lieutenant-Commander Alliston to the Warramunga on 30 September 1944 at 0840 because her captain was ill and was put ashore for medical attention. This was to happen twice again to Commander MacKinnon.

On Sunday 1 October 1944 two more battleships and some troopships escorted by many destroyers arrived during the forenoon. Exercises at sea were common place, the huge dry dock was used for the first time by lifting one of the old Pearl Harbour sunken battleships to examine its bottom plates.

More films became available from the US ships - we enjoyed them all, although our projectors were taking a bit of keeping together and the torpedo space was a little tight for comfort and viewing. The foc'sle was only used if considered safe and a no-rain forecast?

Another ship's concert was held by visiting entertainers and this would be the last for some time. Earlier we missed the Bob Hope Show ashore but saw one of his films 'They Got Me Covered'. We went to sea to be used as a torpedo target ship for the destroyers Mullaney and Bush, refuelled Mullaney and afterwards carried out a 4" and close range weapons shoot.

On 3 October 1944 Lieutenant-Commander Alliston rejoined Shropshire from Warramunga, but again Commander N.A. MacKinnon of Warramunga had a relapse and Lieutenant-Commander Alliston was discharged from Shropshire to take over as captain on 5 October for the remainder of the period. Commander MacKinnon was being looked after in our sick bay and later on the bridge by Chief Ralston. Both Arunta and Warramunga underwent the dirty and hot task of boiler cleaning in a hurry whilst on 4 October 1944 Engineer Captain L.P.J. Carr OBE, the Squadron Engineer Officer, inspected Shropshire, Arunta and Australia for damage control arrangements in that order.

On the 7th we streamed and recovered our paravanes as well as having a torpedo firing and recovery exercise. The Commodore also carried out a commodore's inspection of Warramunga, Arunta and forwarded his report to the Australian Naval Board. Admiral of the Fleet Lord Keyes GCB, KCVO, CMG, DSO, LLD, DCL, accepted an invitation visit from Australia, from Commodore Collins and met all the squadron's ships' captains from Task Force 74 as well as speaking to the ship's company.

On the 10th we had a 'fire' exercise abreast the wardroom galley and later watched 9 large fully loaded troopships leave harbour whilst others came in to load and leave. Manus was a mass of ships of all descriptions. The Australian Squadron: Shropshire, Australia, Arunta, Warramunga and USS Beale left Manus on 11 October at 20 knots with Phoenix (Admiral Berkey aboard) and Destroyers USS Hutchins, Daly, Bache,Killen for Hollandia.

Arriving in Hollandia, the fleet grew to number 700 ships and when we left on the 13th after refuelling and taking on additional ammunition and stores, we escorted part of this massive landing force, Echelon L1 of 40 000 men, with the assistance of four cruisers, one aircraft carrier, thirty destroyers, fifteen troopships, 112 LCIs and LSTs. Commander MacKinnon again well, returned to Warramunga and Lieutenant-Commander Alliston rejoined Shropshire on the 13th, but not for long, Commander MacKinnon again became ill and Lieutenant-Commander Alliston assumed command of Warramunga for the third time, transferring on 17 October, as we refuelled at sea.

It was a rough and monotonous trip - our speed being 8 knots. On the 15th the remainder of the landing force Echeclon L1 joined us from Manus and there were ships stretched out as far as the eye could see. Our own troopships Westralia, Manoora and Kanimbla were in the fleet heading for Leyte Gulf.

USS Bache came alongside with despatches on the 14th. The weather was very good and when looking at those troops in those small flat bottomed barges rolling in the swell we all hoped it would remain so. Finally it rained heavily all morning on Sunday 15th, at least giving the Marines a chance to wash up before the landing. On the 16th we refuelled two destroyers, Warramunga and John Rogers. Arunta came alongside with despatches on the 17th and later on the same day we refuelled from the fleet tanker Sarana.

Refuelling was completed with speed by the stokers - we took on 670 tons, the total time for the exercise being executed from 1509 to 1528 whilst underway at 7 knots. This was a never forgotten and most exciting exercise, especially viewing the boiling sea between the two ships and keeping in mind how close we were to the Japanese airfields on Mindanao Island.

We must not forget our own RAN ship Gascoyne who was in Leyte Gulf dropping Drum and Dan market buoys with anchors and moorings well before we arrived. Gascoyne was still operating during the landings and bombardment, etc, and witnessed thirty-nine air attacks on the landing force ships, four of which were hit, and recorded thirty aircraft shot down. Gascoyne suffered minor damage when four bombs dropped close to her and one of her crew was wounded from A/A shrapnel. This survey ship was fired on and observed hits on five enemy aircraft but only claimed two as their tally. HMDL 1074 later worked in conjunction with Gascoyne and came alongside Shropshire with supplies when the situation was quiet.

Following is Warwick Bracegirdle's personal story of a near disaster: 'I have never told this before, so here is an eye witness account of the morning watch before Leyte Gulf landings on 20 October, 1944 in HMAS Shropshire. As Shropshire's gunnery officer I had to be on top line at night and I always tried to have the 4-8 morning watch on the bridge, as principal control officer. I slept on the bridge in a canvas shelter, on the port side above the compass platform and Captain Nichols slept on the starboard side. To be ready for instant action, one's night vision needs to be adapted with no white lights about, so both of us and our excellent veteran ship's company slept at action stations in the second degree of readiness.

'That historic morning I had taken over the watch as principal control officer with Shropshire heading a column of troop ships, troop transports and landing craft, with similar columns to port and starboard. Formations of mine sweepers and destroyers were ahead. It was a flat, calm, tropical night with very phosphorescent wakes. All ships were at slow speed (10-12 knots), paravanes streamed: "Port lookout bridge, I think we have a mine Sir, in the port paravanes". I said "very good'' and jumped to look into the water over his shoulder. Sure enough, in the phosphorescent wakes caused by our bow wave was a huge horned Japanese mine, about 500-1000 lb of explosives lodged in the cover, bobbing about between 20 and 30 feet from the port side just below the bridge and near the port 40mm Bofor mounting. It had enough explosive to make a hole in the ship's side as long as a Bondi bus. (David Mattiske was the Port Side lookout on the Captain's E.B.I.)

'I said to the lookout, "Well done laddie, keep a good eye on it", then advised the officer of the watch to tell the quartermaster at the wheel to steer a careful course. I then telephoned damage control headquarters in the bows of the ship. 'Henry Cooper, the Lieutenant-Commander on watch down below, answered. I told him the score and all I heard was this noise like phew! I said "What are you doing'' and Henry replied with something like "blowing on my hot tea and my Mae West life jacket". I then told him I had not yet roused our Captain as he faced a terrible long day ahead, but I had moved the Bofors crew inboard from the mine. I suggested that he quickly and quietly move on deck one of the oxyacetaline gas torches ready to cut the tow of the paravane at first light.

'He then diverted all the between-deck traffic away from the port side. This action was taken and then I telephoned the lifebuoy sentry, an ordinary seaman, that in the event of the mine dropping clear he was to throw the life buoy with a smoke float as near to the mine as possible and tell the bridge. With these matters in hand, I gently wakened the captain and reported the mine and repeated the action that had been taken. Captain Nichols emerged from his shelter in his pyjamas, he always changed to his pyjamas, and accompanied me to look over the port lookout's shoulder, and looked at the mine about 20 feet from the ship's side.

'To my astonishment he said "What a beauty, well done port lookout". With a few searching questions about action taken by me and Henry Cooper, "Well now, 'Guns' that's fine, please call me before dawn action stations'' and he went back to his bunk! I was quite amazed at this state, that the captain had complete confidence in his team of veterans.

'Before action stations I called him to report no change, and he went into his sea cabin to shave and change into battle dress and appeared immaculate on the bridge to face the long day. The cable party mustered along the foc'sle. The paravane shoe was hoisted up and before they could cut the port wire with the mine fixed in it the mine bobbed up, flopped and floated to the stern about 20 feet from the ship's side. The ordinary seaman lifebuoy sentry marked the mine with a buoy and the smoke float.

'The captain nodded to the chief yeoman of signals who said to all and sundry on the tactical circuit, that's the whole fleet, "This is porthole, (that's our code name) a Japanese mine marked by my smoke float has just passed down my port side. Porthole out".

'And you just think what the veteran ship's company did to achieve no panic, not to alert an enormous long line of ships and men in their bunks about their stations. We kept that mine as our special secret until the end and then dealt with the matter, despite the tension and the extreme danger to ourselves.

'The trust put in us all, by Captain Nichols and his controlled nonchalance was imparted down the line of this veteran crew. A few seconds after the broadcast to the armada of ships, the sound of pop!, pop!, pop!, pop! could be heard from small arms, opening fire with machine guns, etc, to sink the mine. The menace was over without fuss and without bother and that is how we started a day moving into our bombardment positions.

'As it bobbed away, all the ships marksmen, about five of us, who were already on the quarterdeck and issued with rifles and five rounds of ammunition by Chief OA Jack English had been instructed to try to hit the horns of the mine. We did not fire and it was finally despatched by a Bofor guns' crew with one shell from another ship astern of us'

There were many other mines surfacing and being exploded as the troop ships moved in behind the fleet. Luckily closing up early at 0420 we were at the ready when the first air raid occurred at 0600 but the bombs dropped, fell near the Northern Attack Force consisting mainly of transports, no damage being reported. At 0655 our paravanes were recovered and we proceeded to our waiting positions while three battleships USS's Maryland, West Virginia and Mississippi bombarded the target areas with their 16" and 14'' guns.

Leyte
At 0850 we moved through the battleship line and opened fire on our assigned target at Carmaris Point at 0900 on 20 October 1944. Our engine room department was hard at it because of the constant demands from the bridge and 'Guns' to use the engines for manoeuvring to keep station for accurate firing of both 8'' and 4" guns. Arunta and Warramunga also opened fire at their target areas at 0925.

The planned operation was for battleships to bombard between 0700 and 0900 cruisers between 0900, and 1200, assisted by destroyers to give a blanket covering as well as selected smaller targets. The whole Leyte Force consisted of 700 ships - a very imposing sight - the landings were executed as scheduled in two waves at 1000 and 1005 putting ashore 70 000 troops on the White and Red beaches and by 1015 they were 900 yards inland. During this time dive-bombers were attacking targets and a column of 40 Japanese tanks was sighted and attacked in turn by US planes as US tanks were landed 500 yards further down the beach.

LSIs that had passed us earlier loaded with troops were now returning, some badly damaged and under a smoke screen. An enemy aircraft crashed in flames shortly before General MacArthur arrived at 1110 on board Nashville. A 'suspected' sabotage of electrical gear in an 8'' turret was reported. However, the fault was rectified in time for action and the 'suspected' sabotage was said to be a wrong report. I remember lots of talk that there was a sabotage attempt in 'X' turret because electrical fuses were smashed, said to be by a hammer, probably by an unknown deranged person. The episode just faded and no report was written in the log to prove or disprove the truth of the matter.

A submarine was thought to be in the vicinity of the fleet and the suspect was attacked by destroyers' depth charges but no definite result obtained. Meanwhile a Japanese recce plane also created a buzz as it flew around the fleet in an area covering 30 x 30 miles and when fired at, disappeared off the radar screen possibly shot down. So the forecast by the captain and 'Guns' Bracegirdle as this being the 'Tiger Country' was becoming a reality.

When the landings were completed, Shropshire fired at selected target areas, as the troops moved inland, to finally cease firing at 1158. We had all experienced a constant three hours of 8" and 4'' (599 high explosives shells) gun fire and to those who were able to view and hear, it was a most satisfying experience, especially to some of our 'older' crew members like Chief Ralston, this being his first real taste of action as he looked after Commander MacKinnon who was a very sick man but was allowed to be bedded down on the bridge to be 'in it'.

One should not forget to mention the discomfort of the crew: hot and uncomfortable battledress, stinking hot and stuffy conditions above and below decks coupled with uninteresting food, so to say the least the morale of everybody was more than satisfactory, taking into consideration the inconveniences.

Just before we took up our positions as A/A support and 'on call' Army fire support in the landing area 'Dog' at 1630, a Japanese torpedo bomber was reported coming in from astern of us. The loudspeakers piped instructions to all 'on lifebelts'. This done and three minutes later at 1410 it was reported that Honolulu, a 6'' gun cruiser, had been hit in San Pedro Bay area.

The weather conditions were just right for such an attack as the two torpedo bombers came in using harbour cloud as cover with smooth seas as the best for excellent torpedo launching. Honolulu soon developed a list of 10 degrees as smoke poured from the superstructure and she slowly headed into shallow waters to avoid the possibility of sinking.

Warramunga eight miles east of us had a suspected submarine contact and proceeded to drop depth charges - one was dropped and before the second wasused it was ascertained to be coral or rock so the attack was called off. Even though every aircraft could not be sighted due to darkness they were detected by our radar at a distance of five to fifteen miles and moved in towards us to two miles, but while the ships on both port and starboard quarters were firing, our gunners had no targets.

After this first frantic day comedian bandsman H. Spence started counting his money asking the cost of a single airfare to Sydney. Some of the others were not so amused when the loudspeakers 'piped' 8'' quarters relax at action stations - why? - well twenty-five crew in a small space where only six can lie down at one time. Some relaxation they thought! All night long flares were lighting up the sky and A/A guns were chattering as well as tracers creating patterns.

Dawn action stations on 21 October 1944 brought a low flying enemy aircraft from land flying between Shropshire and Australia. Shropshire fired her 4'' and it was hit, touched and bounced off the sea moving westwards then turned eastward and passed up the port side of Australia under heavy fire from both Shropshire and Australia to finally crash into Australia's foremast at 0605. There was a large explosion (at the time reported to be a bomb from the Jap plane not the plane itself, but later this was proved incorrect). An intense fire on Australia's bridge and (ADP) air defence position was caused by the plane and petrol exploding on contact. The plane finally fell back off the ship into the sea, leaving a few souvenirs aboard.

Australia's mast was broken and bent over at 20 degrees, the 273 radar hut and lantern fell onto the compass platform and both HA directors and DCT were put out of action. Ten officers and rating were killed and sixty-five wounded including the Captain and Commander (N) Rayment killed and our commodore wounded. Our Commanding Officer, Captain C.A.G. Nichols was on this day Saturday, 21 October 1944 ordered to assume the duties of Commander Task Unit 77.3.2 and Commander Task Force 74.

During the forenoon all Commodore Collins' staff, the Staff Officer Operations (SOO) his assistant SOO, together with cypher officers, the USN liaison officer and nineteen signalmen, coders and telegraphists including the five cryptographic aides, moved over to Shropshire as flagship. Things were becoming a little crowded and crew were being moved from place to place rather unceremoniously.

Australia left the area at 1100, joining the Honolulu and both escorted by D.10 in Warramunga, and other US destroyers, finally leaving the area at 1600 for Manus via Kossol Roads. Although air alerts were sounded all day it was reasonably quiet and the Australian Squadron under the command of Captain Nichols patrolled to the east of the transport ship area.

There was plenty of action ashore and those not too tired witnessed US dive bombers in action, sixteen Liberator low level bombing runs and another Jap plane being shot down. The Australia and Honolulu called for air cover and got it in a hurry. LSTs landed their tanks and returned to sea, whilst those so called successful action reports were still giving out conflicting news - eg, the airstrip at Palo taken at 1430 then reported as not taken at 1510.

Our fighters were attacking enemy torpedo bombers approaching the fleet and apart from closing up on and off during the day we closed up at 1630, because enemy aircraft activity was prolific. Smokescreens were laid by destroyers between the main fleet and the land because the Japanese torpedo bombers were using the hills as a covering backdrop as they swooped over the hills and down towards us very low over the water. There was a lot of tracer and Bofor gunfire as dusk finally faded into dark.

On Sunday, 22 October 1944, the Japs with no respect for our sabbath, came in and we drove off the VAL attacking us by 4'' gunfire. There were numerous other air raid red alerts given but for the most part we had a peaceful forenoon.We put to sea to patrol in Leyte Gulf at 1630 and fired on a Jap plane (a Sonia?) and set it on fire to see it disappear over the horizon losing height gradually.

During the afternoon watch another large troop convoy arrived. The Jap positions were dive bombed and some naval bombardments took place by single ships mainly DDs to distract the Japs from the new arrivals. A canoe approached with three Filipinos aboard. They thought our tinned food offers were bombs, but soon returned when we lowered the food by rope instead of dropping or throwing it down the 30' to their craft. During the night at 2300 we closed up again when flares and gunfire were observed at Vigea Pt.

Early during the morning of 23 October at dawn action stations there were many enemy aircraft about - one flew over the top of us and was gone before we saw it. A US destroyer Russell intercepted and sank several fully laden Jap barges headed for the Leyte landing areas; not one got through. The fleet A/A firing was constant and heard from south to north of our position as we approached our next bombardment target area. We opened fire at 1745 until 1746 1/2 on the 23rd and as we had moved into 3000 yards from the San Joachin village anchored and let go a few 8" shells for 1 1/2 minutes.

At 1610 whilst at supper we were watching a tug towing an American destroyer which was down by the stern, when all hell broke loose. At 1615 action stations were called as two enemy aircraft came in diving through our flak, then headed for shore turning to come back towards us again, both veering off towards the southern attack force. Because of the heavy concentration of fire from all nearby ships there was flak everywhere, evidenced by the smoke puffs from A/A fire. A few minutes later our radar reported five bogeys coming in at us from each quarter - our fighters were close handy and drove them off as we increased speed to 20 knots. Another bogey was reported coming up on our stern - it dropped its flare a fair way off and faded away. In the meantime some light relief. It was reported there was a dance held in Palo on the previous night - the 22nd, called the 'Ball of Liberation'. With that news it brought forth a few ribald comments from some of the ship's comedians to make us laugh - eg, 'What only one, well how the hell can you have fun'.

Incidentally large numbers of Filipinos were sighted by our lookouts, moving from the hills area to the shore, obviously trying to avoid being caught between the opposing combatants. We settled down to a reasonably peaceful night to be awakened the next morning, 24 October 1944, to prepare for another short bombardment at 0733 to 0736 in support of the US troops.

Soon after the fleet suffered the heaviest of air raids so far experienced. Even though an estimate, our radar operators reported that between 80-100 enemy aircraft were approaching from the north-westward, assumed to be from Luzon, but only twenty to thirty penetrated to the transport area. Eight (8) were shot down by our fighters and the groups were observed to be mainly Zekes, Tonys, Bettys and Charlies. A Zero (Zeke) attacked us directly and our 4" drove it away at 0835, before our pompoms or Oerlikons could effectively open fire. There were two bombers very high over us dropping bombs which fell 500 yards from our port side on the beam and another 200 yards dead ahead - the ship shuddered slightly when they exploded.

These waves of planes, all twenty reported by our radar, another ten waves coming on port side, eighteen to twenty planes on the port bow and torpedo carrying (Betty's) large bombers coming in on the port side. Two were in flames, one crashed into a large LST setting it alight and whilst a US cruiser and Arunta laid a smokescreen to protect the LST it sank at about 1000. At 0900 two groups of bogeys port and starboard bow were reported at nine miles and
coming in.

Our radar reported a large group of bogeys returning in the direction of Luzon at a distance of eighty miles. So the assumption was proving correct because shortly afterwards another large group of fifty bogeys was reported closing on the fleet coming from the direction of Luzon Japanese air base. Joe Barrington (MID) advised that by experience and viewing the radar blips around the curved edge of the screen he could judge distances up to about 110 miles on a clear day although effectively the range was about eighty.

Another air-raid red as three more groups increasing to seven groups approached - the groups were attacked by our fighters and dispersed - no results reported from this air battle. However, out of 120 Japanese bombers coming at us previously, nineteen bombers were shot down over the fleet and we lost seven fighters. To confuse the enemy, smoke floats were dropped by all ships between the land mass and the fleet as we moved out to sea at 1120 to refuel. Two tankers were available to refuel three battleships, several cruisers and many destroyers and all ships not refuelling protected the others by circling the whole assembly of ships - a comforting sight.

During this period we had been closed up for long periods (eight hours at a time), everybody below decks suffering stuffy conditions as they in particular perspired profusely being dressed in long trousers, long-sleeved shirts or overalls and anti-flash gear - a most uncomfortable situation although as Len Burgess said 'that was the least of our troubles'.

At 1500 we went alongside the fleet tanker Ashtabula and closed up at action stations from being at second degree of readiness. Another enemy aircraft was shot down and many others, Zekes/Zeros, were circling the fleet awaiting their chance to attack but in turn were attacked and driven off by our fighters.

During this torrid time our galley was working hard to prepare quick, simple, non-messy meals and although not top cuisine we did receive, for example, boiled eggs for breakfast, tinned sausages and 'red lead' for lunch and camp pie or bully beef for supper. Some variation of food for the lucky ones depending on nearness to the best galley, was tinned beans and pork for the action station breakfast followed by frankfurts for lunch and tinned fruit and our 'favorites' bully beef for supper.

For those in the open above the upper deck steaming slowly through the artificial chemical fog during dawn and dusk was not very pleasant, and eventually, until all ships had completed refuelling; we had to suffer with constant smoke-screening as the protective ships steamed around us.

The Naval Battle of Surigao Strait

The Last Great Sea Battle in World War II

During the afternoon watch, 24 October 1944, reports came through that two Japanese battle fleets were approaching Surigao Strait from the Sulu Sea and that our bombers were waiting to attack. A third Japanese battle fleet under Vice-Admiral Kurita was, thankfully, directed further north to attack our carrier forces. It had the two largest battleships in the world the Yamato and Mushashi of 63 000 tons with 18.1'' guns, in the fleet.

The US Command claimed hits on one or both battleships in the bombing. Only minor damage was done to Fuso and a destroyer or Mogami Class Jap cruiser. Even though initial reports of the number of Japanese ships were confusing, the two fleets commanded by Vice-Admiral's Nishimura and Shima combined, consisted of 2 14'' gun battleships Yamashiro (flag) and Fuso, three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser and eight destroyers, a total of fourteen warships. A formidable force to contend with as it was their intention to destroy the Leyte landings. Our task, to prevent this, was in effect a police type action with some thirty-nine warships and thirty-nine PT boats spread out over a large area north, south and centre of Surigao Straits. The thirty-nine PT boats were split up into three main groups, nine cruising south of the straits fifteen in the centre and fifteen just north of the Straits.

Vice-Admiral Kinkaid, Commander of the US 7th Fleet directed that Rear- Admiral Oldendorf take charge of units of the 7th Fleet to prepare for battle and to cover the Straits. This battle fleet consisted of six old battleships, West Virginia, Tennessee, Calfornia, Pennsylvania, Mississippi and Maryland formed into the battleship fire group, to fire over the top of destroyer screen with right flank cruisers of HMAS Shropshire, USS Phoenix and Boise with Rear-Admiral Berkey commanding and the left flank cruisers USS Louisville (Flagship), Minneapolis, Portland, Denver and Columbia to cover the flanks as we spread across the thirty miles of Leyte Gulf, north of Surigao Strait.

In addition the following destroyer squadrons were deployed: Desron 54 (5 DDs), Desron 24 (6 DDs) including HMAS Arunta, Des div Xray (5 DDs), Desron 56 (9 DDs) and 3 DDs patrolling to the east of Leyte Gulf. So in all we had an excellent chance of success, bearing in mind the blackness of the night and the radar limitations because of the proximity of the land. Initially the fleet was depending on early warnings from our PT boat captains.

Before 24 October 1944 Nishimura's Southern Force C was attacked by US aircraft in the Sulu Sea but only minor damage was inflicted on the battleship Fuso and one of the escorting destroyers.

Under the overall command of Admiral S. Toyoda who was based ashore in Tokyo and then through a further spilt command, both Vice-Admiral Nishimura, Southern Force C, responsible to Vice-Admiral Kurita of the Southern Command and Vice-Admiral Shima 2nd Strike Force, responsible to the Vice-Admiral of the South West Command of the 5th Fleet, virtually acted on their own initiative avoiding any communication. Nishimura, the junior, commanded the battleship fleet; Shima the senior, the cruiser fleet. This resulted in jealousy and lack of co-ordination between the two fleets as they steamed through the Surigao Straits.

The plan put forward by Admiral Toyoda called SHO Victory was being enacted on 24 October. It was planned that Nishimura's battle fleet arrive at 0500 on the 25th to destroy General MacArthur's landings at the Leyte beaches. Shima's cruiser fleet was to arrive at 0600 to deliver the final and decisive back-up blow to destroy MacArthur's dream of 'I have returned' to recapture the Philippines. Already Shima's fleet was forty miles astern, over two hours away, at 18 knots. The two fleets had never worked together as a team and this placed great pressures on hopes for a Japanese victory.

The part played by the PT boats during the few hours before the battle cannot be stressed enough. These small fast boats, with their young and daring captains, took great risks in attacking and harassing the heavily armed Japanese warships. PTs usually carried a 40mm Bofor, 37mm machine-gun, 13mm machine-gun, 2-4 torpedoes, sometimes mortars and/or rockets. They were fitted with radar which was an advantage for night stalking.

In the meantime Vice-Admiral Halsey's fast and new battleship fleet had been decoyed by Admiral Ozawa's carrier fleet and was steaming north, Sprague's light carrier fleet was in jeopardy. Later Admiral Halsey refuted the accusation but there was no doubt our northern flanks were exposed to attack by Admiral Kurita's huge battleship fleet.

From about 2215 on the 24th PT boats 130, 131, 152 struck at the Japanese ships, firing their torpedoes without results. PT152 was hit by a 4.7'' shell from the destroyer Shigure and had her radio put out of action, delaying advice to our Fleet Commander Admiral Oldendorf. During this time the battleship group and the right and left flank cruisers were all waiting to carry out Oldendorf 's plan to put into effect the old fashioned naval ploy of crossing the 'T' used by Nelson to defeat enemy ships as they sailed in line ahead to be cut off and then destroyed by our broadsides before they could turn to fire their broadsides; in fact to restrict their firepower to a minimum number of guns pointing at us.

The right flank ships including Shropshire were cruising at 10 knots changing course, stopping engines, drifting, starting engines, proceeding to 'new course', north of the strait. The PT boats were still in action, we could see searchlights flashing, heard gunfire, explosions and observed fires but from all this action only one of the thirty-nine PT boats was badly hit and beached to avoid sinking.

At 0026 Oldendorf finally received word the Japanese fleets were moving through the Surigao Straits but because of radar restrictions it was not until Shropshire's surface radar operators picked up Nishimura's Fleet at 0215 at a range of twenty-miles that the destroyer squadrons moved in at 30-35 knots to fire torpedoes and receive return fire for their trouble from the Japanese. They approached within 4.3 miles of the Japanese fleet. Forty-seven torpedoes were fired at ranges of 8750-1150 yards in a space of twelve minutes, regardless of being caught in searchlights and fired at, but hits were claimed. One hit Yamashiro but did not slow the battleship, two hits on Fuso which stopped dead in the water after circling to starboard. Yamagama was sunk, Mishishio stopped in the water and Asagumo had her bows blown off. All these results were picked up on Shropshire's radar.