So the first attack was a magnificent result for the destroyers. Just after 0325 Shima's fleet arrived in the Straits to be attacked by PT137 which torpedoed a light cruiser Akabuma thinking it was a destroyer - a lucky mistake indeed. Destroyer Squadron 24 which included Arunta moved in at 25 knots and fired twenty-nine torpedoes and as well, fired their main armament. Hits were claimed, explosions heard and fires observed. The destroyers turned away to avoid the Japanese return fire.

It was later stated by Commander Buchanan, of Arunta, that he was sure the destroyer Killen fired the torpedo which hit Yamashiro failing to slow her down. After the war the captain of Shigure thought Fuso's back was broken by torpedoes hitting the keel and as Killen had its torpedo depths set at 22' the assumption could be correct. Shortly afterwards at 0338 the battleship Fuso blew up and broke in two. She was burning fiercely and racked with explosions but did not sink. Our radar again showed numerous hits on the Japanese ships particularly, the largest blips indicating Yamashiro and Fuso. Before the main battle fleet opened fire Arunta was warned to move clear as she was fouling the battleships line of fire and risked being sunk. The USS Hutchins raced in again and fired five torpedoes but no hits were observed even though both Yamashiro and the broken Fuso were now lying dead in the water.

Between 0353 and 0356 all hell broke loose as all the battle fleet consisting of six battleships, four heavy cruisers, and four light cruisers, opened fire. The battleships opened fire at a range of eleven miles. Shropshire opened fire at nine miles closing into seven miles. Hundreds of tons of armour piercing and high explosive shells were fired into the Japanese fleet to ensure no ship escaped.

As most wartime reports of the action only contain a brief general comment, I will give in more detail the part Shropshire played in the destruction of the Japanese fleet. During the battle Shropshire opened fire at 0356, a little later than the US cruisers due to the limitation of our 285 radar set which was not designed for main armament fire control. The target range was extreme for its bearing tube in the director. However, when we did open fire the ship achieved at one stage the highest rate of fire ever for 8" gun turrets eight broadsides were fired in two minutes, this reflected great credit on the turret crews taking into consideration the turrets had been in operation for 16 years and had fired 2396 8'' rounds since Shropshire arrived in Australia and went on her first battle tour in December 1943.

The right flank cruisers were on a course of 275 degrees steaming at 10 knots when we closed up for night action stations at 0238. We altered course to 075 degrees, stopped, and then continued on a course of 270 again at 10 knots with the SG radar reporting targets bearing 161 degrees at 34 300 yards. Our position was 10 degrees 32'.N. 125 degrees 19'.E. Arunta with Desron 24 was closer to the target at a range of 18 800 yards and steaming at 19 knots. A large explosion and flash was heard and we altered course to 120 degree, all cruisers turning to starboard together our speed was 10 knots as the ship's radar picked up the enemy steaming on a course of 010, speed 17 knots.

Shropshire, leading the right flank cruisers, took over as guide ship from Phoenix and increased speed to 15 knots. By this time all ships were constantly altering course while the enemy battle fleet was still on a course of 350 degrees, speed 15 knots - the earlier attacks by PTs and DDs had slowed the ships down. We altered course to port to 090 degrees and another large fleet being reported on a bearing of 155 degrees we were ordered to stand by to open fire. Enemy's speed was now 18 knots on a course of 340 degrees. The right flank cruisers were ordered to open fire by Rear-Admiral Berkey.

As mentioned before we opened fire at 0356, three minutes after Phoenix and Boise due to radar limitations; firing to starboard for our first of three broadsides from all turrets and all guns. I mention 'all guns' because throughout this night action battle broadsides did not necessarily mean all eight guns were being fired. After the first three broadsides fired on course 090 all cruisers altered course to 270 degrees until we ceased fire at 0409 1/2 having fired thirty-two broadsides. Throughout the manoeuvring of the ship our guns fired continuously, some as low as four gun broadsides of which there were (2) two because as we were swinging from 090 degrees to 270 degrees. The Japanese targets were dead ahead and X and Y turrets could not bear on the enemy target. In addition we fired 10 x 8 gun broadsides, 10 x 7, 6 x 6 and 4 x 5 to give credence to our total of 32 broadsides.

Shropshire fired for a total of twelve minutes and forty seconds and because of various factors to be mentioned later, total guns fired were 214 out of a possible 248. Although the success of our shoot is not easy to ascertain, because fall of shot was difficult to observe due to other ships firing into the targets, our radar operators did an excellent job of reporting nineteen definhite straddles as well as other short and over, fall of shot. An excellent effort and one to be proud of by our gunnery and radar crews, during their part in sinking the battleship Yamashiro. We finally claimed sixteen straddles as direct hits as well as 3 other broadsides "smothered" by other ships firing simultaneously according to Mr. Perrin's range spotting operators.

Following are brief technical and personal comments from various members of Shropshire's crew as to what they saw and understood our role to be during this 'The Last Great Sea Battle' in World War II.

Shropshire was the only Australian cruiser to fire on and help sink an enemy battleship ably supported by one of our destroyers Arunta. These following paragraphs make the Battle of Surigao Straits a reality for the RAN. It is not a passing comment which is to be found in most books about the Battle for Leyte Gulf and or the Battle for the Philippines. Following are individual reports.

The Officer Commanding the Australian Squadron -
Captain C.A.G. Nichols:
We fired thirty-two broadsides at what was thought to be a battleship - it was accurate and hits were obtained. The standard of drill was very high and reflects highly on the gunnery department. Shropshire suffered no damage even though four broadsides from the enemy passed overhead. Material failures were nil and the gunnery equipment performed satisfactorily. The SG radar was out of action for a short period due to a carelessly closed door which was unhinged by the gun blasts. The engineering department worked efficiently as did the whole of the ship's company who were calm and kept to their tasks. The control and radar team's work was especially praiseworthy. Individual reports from others of the ship's company are noteworthy. At 0350 Captain Nichols ordered our Gunnery Officer Warwick Bracegirdle to stand by to open fire.

Lieutenant-Commander Bracegirdle (Guns)
Ordered open fire at 0356 in 'blind fire' at a radar range given as 15 300 yards on a gyro bearing of 162 degrees (relative bearing Green 72) and ship's course 090 degrees. This was the largest gunnery target received from our action information centre, as we turned to course 270 degrees firing five broadsides, two of them dead ahead from A and B turrets whilst X and Y turrets were swinging to be ready on the port side; straddles were reported by radar so 'Rapid Broadsides' was ordered and in some cases only five to seven gun broadsides were fired due to various minor problems the reasons to be related by others.

He reported the night action at Surigao Straits was quite good and our 8'' crews were steady in achieving four broadsides a minute, Shropshire fought this night battle at a speed of 10 knots with the two 6" cruisers Phoenix and Boise crossing the 'T' of the enemy line of advance which put paid to their hope of routing the landing forces of General MacArthur.

Hardly a word was spoken on the bridge during the action except for course alterations but when the radar spotter in the TS (Transmitting Station) reported broadside No 3 scored a hit on the enemy's bridge he saw in the glare of an explosion behind it, the Yamashiro's high pagoda-like structure silhouetted. He ordered all guns to fire rapid broadsides at the enemy ship - a devastating victory for us all.

One of the main reasons the ship's gunnery was so good was due to carrying out exercises with Nashville five days before the Leyte action and calibrating our guns to radar and making corrections after a 15 500 yard practice shoot.

"SURIGAO" THE LAST GREAT SEA BATTLE click to enlarge
Brief notes telling the "SURIGAO" story of the photograph.
1.	Wear dark glasses - Most of the action occurred during the Middle Watch. 25/10/1944.
2.	All the warships involved including those sunk are shown in this photograph of my "Diorama" 28'x12'x8' cloud backdrop.
3.	2 Japanese battle fleets entered Surigao Strait to attack "Tacloban" landings, Leyte Gulf.
4.	39 PT boats (Motor Torpedo Boats) stationed above, below and in the strait.
5.	6 old battleships stationed across the top of the strait. (4 sunk/raised at Pearl Harbour)
6.	3 cruisers on the right flank including HMAS Shropshire. 5 cruisers on the left flank included USS Louisville the Flagship.
7.	27 destroyers stationed in both protective duties surrounding the battle fleet and as Destroyer Squadrons to attack the Japanese fleets.
8.	The PT boats attacked first - driven off - 10 damaged. Only 1 torpedo hit and damaged, 1 Japanese light cruiser which was ordered to retire (top left corner of picture) .
9.	Destroyer Squadrons attacked including HMAS Arunta. 1 battleship torpedoed exploded split in two - did not sink - later (Fuso) . 4 destroyers hit (2 sank) (1 sunk later by cruisers) (1 escaped) (Denver and Columbia) . 1 battleship torpedoed - slowed - sunk by battleships and cruisers ( Yamashiro - flagship) .
10.	Battleships and cruisers opened fire for 15 minutes. 1 Japanese heavy cruiser damaged and retired (Mogami) . 1 battleship sunk (Yamashiro) . Only 1 destroyer escaped - damaged slightly (Shigure) .
11.	HMAS Shropshire fired 32 broadsides at " Yamashiro" - 19 broadsides hit target. HMAS Arunta fired 4 torpedoes - missed - 3 broadsides hit target - others smothered. (HMAS Arunta as Captain "D" led USS Beale and USS Killen into the attack - 1 of Killen's torpedoes hit Yamashiro and she slowed) .
12.	Further to the attack Captain Nichols mentioned in his report to Rear-Admiral Oldendorf that Arunta's captain, Commander Buchanan's torpedo attack was probably affected due to the presence of another Desron coming into attack, required Arunta to increase speed before firing and Beale and Killen slowing down subsequently reducing the accuracy of the shoot in total.
13.	(Captain C.A.G. Nichols - HMAS Shropshire) (Commander A.E. Buchanan - HMAS Arunta)
14.	1 near collision occurred between two US battleships (top right) . (1 collision between 2 Japanese heavy cruisers (not shown) (Mogami and Nachi).
15.	Shown centre left, Japanese destroyer taking off the crew of the crippled Mogami (later torpedoed by Japanese) .
16.	130 torpedoes fired during the battle - only about 10 torpedoes hit.
17.	Total Japanese killed approximately 5000. Total Allied personnel (all USN) killed 35, wounded 101.
18.	The drenching gunfire of the US ships was overwhelming but not always accurate. It was estimated that one in ten shells hit targets during naval battles. (Shropshire's effectively hit one in two shells) .
19.	HMAS Shropshire requested permission to sink a damaged Japanese destroyer - denied - 2 light USN cruisers did the job, the Denver and Columbia.
20.	Strike force formed up to attack Japanese fleet to the north of Leyte Gulf. Only Shropshire Involved and to be used as a "decoy"? Supported by 2 destroyers or 2 cruisers?
21.	What the Japanese did not know. The US ships were down to less than 20% of their ammunition/fuel/supplies after the Tacloban landings. HMAS Shropshire still had a full load because Captain Nichols through Commander Bracegirdle our "Guns" had overloaded our 8'' magazines from normal 1500 to 2000 shells.
PS.	For guidance only?
PPS	An interesting post-war battle comment by the Japanese Minister of the Navy, Admiral Yonai, "Our defeat at Leyte was tantamount to the loss of the Philippines. When you took the Philippines that was the end of our resources." (i.e. oil).

Chief Petty Officer AWF Cooper, Gunner's Mate 8'' TS Elevation Officer
Arthur Cooper in the transmitting station was hoping to range on the Japanese at 8-9000 yards and was surprised that the range was 15-16 000 yards when we opened fire. The radar operator of 274 was continuously passing the enemy's range and even though the 273 lost the target causing a short delay the TS was ready. Mr Perrin a warrant officer, gunner and a very able and efficient member of the gunnery department had applied the MCC Mystic Correction - (our known straddle correction when using radar) of up to 300 yards and added 200 more yards found necessary from practice firings.

Finally, all things adjusted, Arthur Cooper helped by Mr Perrin and his TS team passed 'broadsides' to the turrets and the 'gun ready lamps' lit up. The order to 'SHOOT' set everything in motion. The Gunnery Officer Warwick Bracegirdle, a cool thinker in action, knowing all was ready ordered 'wait - do not fire until fall of shot reports come in from our first broadside.'

Lieutenant Austin, our control officer, also ordered left 4'' an amazing decisive piece of line spotting since it was pitch dark. However, he explained later that as our K shell salvo landed it showed yellow just as a salvo from a US ship exploded to lnight up the area and showed our yellow splashes a little off line to the right. All spotting was as predicted from our two radar operators.

Mr Perrin requested permission for rapid broadsides and then for the next twenty-two broadsides everybody was fully extended. It was considered that provided six gun-ready lamps came on, it was enough for a broadside. Several intervals were timed from gun fire to fire gong - a space of eleven seconds recorded - everyone was grinning and whispering 'you beauty'. Even though the gunnery officer advised zig-zags, it made little difference, although some shot fell short and over indicating turret gun layers not being positively on when guns fired.

Arthur Cooper reported: 1. Target burning from stem to stern 2. Enemy shells passed overhead. 3. Our battleships being fired at. 4. Our broadcaster to between deck parties creating interference and being told in no uncertain terms by 'Guns' to get off the air. 5. The bearing rate motor in TS gave out - Mr Perrin quickly ordered clutch to hand, etc - results very effective.
6. The TS team was very confident and they were very sure of the battle outcome.

Mr W.N. Maughan Warrant Ordnance Officer
Mr Maughan reported the low angle fire control equipment, AFCT III, functioned perfectly However, the true range PEN became sticky and caused operational problems. Ordinance Artificer III H W. Bradley fitted a a 'straddle correction scale' designed by Mr W A. Perrin which proved of great value and replaced the harder to use horizontal scale.

There were no breakdowns, no failures in the director or controls. 'A' Turret: All machinery worked efficiently - only a few rounds missed due to the difficulty of opening cordite cannisters. 'B' Turret: All machinery worked efficiently - only a few rounds missed due to minor, quickly rectified problems such as interlock gate valve lever jammed, flange leaking fifteen gallons of oil and slowness of cordite handling room. O A. Strahan worked exceptionally fast to keep things moving.

'X' Turret: Machinery worked efficiently and suffered no defects. Some poor drill in the cordite handing room caused a half charge to be loaded - following this the chopper was opened, and another half charge inserted (definitely bad drill) and very dangerous, not only to the turret's crew but to the whole ship but the charge fell and lay on its side, prevented the cage to bottom as well as the top cage rising to its top position. O A Taylor had a hectic time trying to fix the problem. Finally Chief O.A. Headford was sent to 'X' turret and located and corrected the problem but meanwhile ten rounds were not fired.

'Y': Turret All machinery worked efficiently, except for another interlock problem quickly attended to by O A. Farrelly

The final comment: All turrets were firing when 'Cease Fire' was ordered on completion of this night action. After the action was over Mr Maughan reported all turrets fixed structure machinery was working at 100 percent efficiency although when 'A' turret was on a bearing of red or green 90, some adjustment was required later to fix the shell ring to prevent a tightening up as the shell bogies were fed in.

Mr W. Perrin 'Gunner'
Mr Perrin reported the difficulty of target identification due to the radar 273 set being told to follow the main armament director when the director was not on target. This caused slight delay in opening fire as the AFCT was not started until 0353 and no suggestions as to the enemy's course or speed were obtained before opening fire. Inclination and speed were deduced by the tactical plot and finally drift being constant, ballistic settings were corrected. A correction of up to 500 yards was applied to the radar range. Other changes to the range matching dials of 300 yards as well as 200 yards on the range plot straddle correction scale gave a result that exceeded all expectations. Ratekeeping was difficult, as the pitometer log was defective, our own fluctuation of speed having an effect on both range and bearing plots, as well as the enemy changing course repeatedly.

Communications: although in the past our telephones were complained about, on this occasion all worked well. However, as mentioned by the gunnery officer earlier, once the ship's warning telephone 'broadcasters' was instructed to cease promulgations to the below deck working parties the problems evaporated.

One turret captain was surprised to say the least - he had not received the order 'rapid broadsides' - but his guns were automatically shooting at four rounds per minute Mr Perrin also mentioned the sticky true range pens caused by the temperature conditions and made a comment about his own designed 'straddle correction scale' in that being fitted vertically instead of horizontally it was more easily viewed by all the team.

He finalised his report by commending the conduct and efficiency of his team, mentioning Bandsman A.W. Rule who performed his duties as Range Spotting Operator extremely well and with a special mention regarding both Able Seamen K.J. Cotter and A.H. Ward. He could not speak highly enough of the really fine job they carried out as operators of the radar range panels. These seamen gave their spots loudly and clearly without hesitation and in his view contributed to the success of this action and, quote 'A great proportion of the credit for any success achieved by Shropshire must go to these ratings'.

In conclusion Mr Perrin said TS operation was a 'piece of cake'. The confusion of the old style personal spotting reports was always a bug bear but now was entirely eliminated by radar range spotting reports.

Chief Petty Officer Arthur Cooper, Chief Gunner's Mate: The targets were picked up by radar at 32 000 yards and we opened fire at 15 000 yards - our fall of shot hooter soundings enabled corrections to be made especially as we took corrections from other ships firing and hitting the targets and illuminating the enemy vessels. After the fourth broadside we fired in accordance with the gun ready lamps showing at least six guns ready before ringing the fire gongs. Some gun layers barely had time to get 'on' target before the guns fired.

Four enemy broadsides passed over the top but no interference was experienced by our radar nor did 'apparent' radar jamming attempts interfere with ranging or spotting by our radar panels. As the enemy moving at nineteen knots slowed to fifteen, then to ten and finally stopped dead in the water.

Lieutenant L.S. Austin, our spotting officer, reported both radar sets 273 and 285 were giving ranges, but 285 gave no bearings and for a few short seconds we were without radar. Eventually the 285 set gave us a target. The tracer from our HE shell was easy to follow and our first broadside was lit up clearly by a hit from another ship followed by several more explosions on the target from our continuing broadsides.

Lieutenant H. Hardiman - After 8" Gun Control Officer. Reported at 0356 25 October 1944, with US 6'' cruisers Phoenix and Boise astern opening fire with a stream of 6'' shells falling on a Jap target at green 90 to Shropshire and us following two minutes later firing blind because radar 273 had not picked up the target. The TS officer reported 'have 273 and 285, put on and held'.

Broadsides were ordered and after the second broadside we altered course to starboard and as the target moved across we continued firing from A and B turrets later joined by X and Y turrets. The Japanese battleship was being continually hit by us and our consorts until it became a blazing inferno from stem to sternm. The battleship fired its main armament 14" guns as well as its secondary 6'' guns at Shropshire, two broadsides of which fell short and four broadsides passed over the top.

Quote: 'The day and night of radar spotting and control has undoubtedly arrived and the general picture of American and Australian units in perfect co-ordinated 'radar concentration' with such devastating effect was a revelation. The general use of tracer fitted shell simplifies the visual problem'.

Our intense 'full flank' broadsides had a very blinding effect especially on the 4'' guns crew as well as others unprepared and caught napping as rapid fire continued. Final word was, there were no material failures in the after control, and morale was high, creating too much chatter amongst the personnel who were instructed to quieten down.

Mr G.J. Hartley, Gunner, (Director Officer): The 'gyro' had been running for three and a half hours before opening fire and the mercury switches adjusted to a dip height correction for a horizon of 12 yards and this 'apparent horizon was held through to 0700 as well after the ceasefire. Because we opened fire at 15 800 yards the dip correction applied to the gyro was in error throughout and the accurate alignment of the crosswire was impossible.

Mr Hartley changed from blind to visual fire after the first broadside and apart from one or two minor problems the director's crew performed their duties most efficiently from start to finish of the action. He recommended that director Layer's seat be made readily adjustable because the change from blind to visual required him to operate in a half stand/sitting position, a most uncomfortable strain to place on a person's back and legs.

Leading Seaman S.J. Mason, CR II R/T Fore 8'' Director, made similar observations in that he saw tracer shell falling into the general area, saw yellow flashes both to the right and left finally observing the target on fire as we ceased fire.

Petty Officer J. Feltham, Gunner's Mate, HACO/HADT, reported enemy forces entering Leyte Gulf and our battle fleet being sent to intercept. Shropshire ahead with Phoenix and Boise astern with battleships on our port side.

The PT boats were attacking, destroyers firing torpedoes and main armament, searchlights probing, starshells lighting up the sky. Phoenix and Boise astern both with fifteen 6" guns opened fire and he noticed they were using flashless cordite. Shropshire opened fire with a blinding flash from our 8'' guns and hits observed.

Battleships opened fire on our port side from long range, with high trajectories. We altered course and fired to port as did the 6" cruisers to see the enemy ship burning from stem to stern whilst another had exploded into a sheet of flame - four ships now ablaze and dead in the water. One ship fired at us and the broadsides passed overhead.

Petty Officer E. Mitchell, No. 2 HADT, heard the report of battleships and US cruisers opening fire followed by Shropshire. Flashes and smoke obscured our sight while the concussion of our own 8'' shook the director. When we turned to fire from port we were on our blind side. I did observe some of the enemy's shells pass over and splash down off our starboard side. As we steamed towards the Japanese ships, flashes of what could have been gunfire from a destroyer were seen but it was soon sunk by the US cruisers.

Able Seaman KJ. Cotter and A.H. Ward, Radar Officers: Their report and dedication to duty was classified by Mr Perrin as more than creditable 'in fact a great proportion of the credit for any success achieved by Shropshire must go to these ratings'. They operated the radar range panels in the transmitting station. A point of interest in their report was 'no return fire was observed from target'.

Lieutenant G.R. Griffiths, Rate Officer: Phoenix and Boise opened fire on Shropshire's starboard quarter followed by other cruisers on the port side. At that time we had no target, then we were 'on' and opened fire. Difficulty was experienced as to whether the hits were ours or not because of hazy visibility but our broadsides were correct for line.

Able Seaman A. Revell, 'B' Turret Range Taker: On approaching the area he saw a lot of tracer shell from PT boats and larger green flashes of return fire from the enemy. He heard the order for our destroyers to attack with torpedoes and the resulting large flashes indicated hits. Then we all opened fire, the shells from the battleships and cruisers could be seen to be pouring into the enemy ships, it seemed to be a continuous stream of shells. The battleship was burning and explosions were all over her whilst other light cruisers were on fire. One blew up and another destroyer standing by was sunk. His final comment was 'our shells seemed to be well on target'.

Lieutenant Ken Stock, Gunnery Officer 4'' Gun Deck: Awaiting a chance to use the 4'' guns, heard of the PT boats attacking and harassing the Japanese fleet in the straits as well as Arunta being ordered out for going in too close when the battleships were about to open fire. He and other 4" gun deck crew with their eyes wide open were caught napping and flash blinded when our 8'' guns opened fire. He mentioned the disappointment, that the 4" guns could not be used that day. His final summing up in the confusion of events was two battleships sunk, two light cruisers and four destroyers sunk and one destroyer escaping was chased by units of the 7th Fleet. (In reality it was 2BB, 1CA, 3DDs sunk, and 1DD did escape, damaged.)

Leading Supply Assistant G.E. Pettit, starboard pompom: 'Early on the morning of 25 October 1944 the wakey wakey message was full of foreboding 'Hands to Actions Stations'' We have a report of a "skunk" twenty-one miles to the westward.'Not very long after, the fire glow of the burning battleship Fuso, a sister ship to Yamashiro was very clear in the western sky.

When we opened up on Yamashiro it seemed to be a pleasant but busy naval battle, though one could not help thinking of the Japanese sailors being killed as hit upon hit was called: then their tracer shells came slowly towards us - two fell short and four passed over and it didn't take much to realise that the next could be 'it' but by then Yamashiro had been hit so many times, not only by our thirty-two broadsides but from the accurate fire of the other allied ships, thus preventing her following up her ranging shots with more accurate gunfire.

As dawn broke a US 6'' gun cruiser fired high trajectories in the sky at a Japanese destroyer trying to escape; the groups of shells from its fifteen guns appeared to be travelling lazily across the sky to inevitably reach their destination, to hit and sink, the destroyer - a beautiful sight for us but deadly for the Japanese. During this fast and furious action Arunta's Captain, Commander A. E. Buchanan was too close in and was ordered, in effect told to 'Get out or be blown out'.

CPO Arthur Cooper, Chief Gunner's Mate giving his brief personal comments - battlers firing at, and enemy firing on our forces and then we opened fire as one of our battlers (unknown) as well as the cruisers Denver and Minneapolis were straddled - we straddled the enemy, and the order came 'Commence Commence Commence' to continue the thirty-two broadsides - target was a battler - she's burning brightly - revenge for Canberra - all ships ceasefire - 4.10 am compass gyro 160 degrees, red 110 degrees, very big explosions at 0415 - enemy opening fire again - the battleship we hammered is below the horizon with explosions coming from her - quite a few went over us but no hits sustained but we did not fire again at the enemy battler later known to be the Yamashiro

Leading Seaman John Turner, Radar Plot. John Turner's enthusiasm makes for great reading: 'Shroppie made a big name for herself in Leyte and again when we were part of the US 7th Fleet in the battle of Surigao Strait when we were credited with getting the nip battler, Yamashiro as a result of one straddle and twenty-eight direct hits from thirty-two broadsides. I think that we all just about 'shit' ourselves when our lovable old skipper 'Old Nick' took us straight up the middle with three Yank battlers on our port and three on our starboard sides in the midst of Japanese over and short falls - each time that the Japanese tried to direct their fire on the six Yank battlers. Being part of such vast sea battles which were written up as being "The Trafalgar of the South West Pacific'' is something to be proud of now, and, later to read how the American and Australian ships smashed the Japanese sea power as effectively as had Nelson in 1805.

Able Seaman S Nicholls, Commander's Runner - After Control: Just before the action, Commander George Oldham, our executive officer, told me to stand ready at all times in case the bridge was put out of action. I guessed if things went against us I would indeed be running but it was not to be. I watched as the gunfire seemed to increase in intensity as battleships, heavy cruisers and especially those fast firing 6" fifteen gun cruisers poured what seemed to be a never ending stream of shells into the enemy ships. Our tracer shells sped away at high speed whilst the enemy tracers seemed to float towards, luckily passing (overhead) and falling short Thankfully, as said later, the ranging shots at us did not produce one hit - Yamashiro did not have a chance, she had been saturated by the fleet's massive broadsides and put out of action.

'My boss, Commander Oldham, was indeed a calm, rather stern, unflappable officer who was in my opinion fair to all, and one in whom confidence could be assumed, to take over in case of necessity.

Able Seaman Nick Melick, Radar Operator - Pom Pom Control Set - On the strength of certain reports that units of the Japanese fleet were seen making their way towards Leyte Gulf we proceeded to sea on patrol knowing that about 40 PT boats were just inside the entrance of Surigao Straits. Around 0230 our surface warning radar set made contact, reporting the enemy was steaming towards us and we closed up.

Our force manoeuvred down to get the hills in the background for action, and an hour later we opened fire. Using tracer the flight trajectory could be followed clearly. It was reported that Arunta had fired four torpedoes at the enemy ships. One of their battleships, Fuso was helplessly on fire and still being fired at to complete the sinking. The other was being attacked continuously and on fire but also firing on us, the shells whistling as they went over to land harmlessly in the sea. The Jap shells also straddled one of our battleships and that was all as we ceased fire.

Their forces were on fire or sunk and no doubt all have not realised the great part played by our radar. Captain Nichols had told us prior to this naval battle that our 281 set had been responsible for more than eight-five percent of all red warnings. Having nothing to do with the main armament shelling and the small cramped radar office with five inside being hot, stuffy and very rowdy, I tried to read. It was hopeless, the noise was so terrific I sneaked up on the upper deck to witness the action so all this time I was again in a box seat. Shropshire had thirty-two broadsides, mostly straddles, and few misses.

Whilst this action was complete and the crippled enemy ships were pursued northwards by our naval forces passing through Surigao Straits, at 0910, our destroyers and PT boats were attempting to pick up survivors. Only three Japs surrendered and they were said to be Oxford Graduates.

It was reported at 0725 by Admiral Kinkaid that our light carrier force, east of Samar was being attacked by an estimated Jap fleet of four battleships, eight cruisers and many destroyers which had passed through San Bernadino Strait at night with the intention of attempting an assault on our naval forces in Leyte Gulf as well as to support Nishimura and Shima to destroy the Leyte landings .

click to enlarge

Strike Force
At 0115 Shropshire was ordered by Commander Task Force 77 to form with the battleships, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, California, cruiser Louisville, flagship Rear-Admiral J.B. Oldendorf, Portland, Minneapolis and thirteen US destroyers, a strike force to attack an enemy battle fleet which was reported to be approaching from the north.

This urgent action was taken by Admiral Kinkaid even though the Leyte battle fleet was very short of ammunition. Admiral Oldendorf had advised Admiral Kinkaid that our Leyte battle fleet was low on fuel and ammunition except for Shropshire and in particular AP shells as the US ships had loaded mainly HE for bombardments and not for prolonged surface actions.

Captain Nichols had, with foresight, taken on more than the usual requirement of 8'' AP and HE shells and on completion of both the Leyte bombardments and the night surface action against Nishimura's battleship Yamashiro, still had close to a maximum storage capacity of 8" AP ammunition.

The US ships were down to approximately twenty percent of AP shells for their battleships and cruisers and the destroyers down to about fifteen percent. A strong 'buzz' emerged that Shropshire could be used as decoy bait to lure Kurita's fleet away until our fleet members could ammunition and refuel.

The reason for this decision taken by Admiral Kinkaid was that the 3rd Fleet commanded by Admiral Halsey and supposedly protecting the Bernardino Straits to prevent the Leyte Landings being attacked from the north, had been decoyed north by the Japanese Admiral Ozawa to attack his very depleted carrier force. This left the approaches unprotected except for Admiral Sprague's light carrier force. At this time the strike force fleet forming up at the eastern entrance to Leyte Gulf was three hours steaming away from being able to help Sprague and moving at ten knots.

Everybody closed up at action stations - as the excitement grew with anticipation of a second naval action. The fleet increased speed to 15 knots and altered course from 250 degrees to 000 degrees to 090 degrees and finally to a course of 270 degrees, speed 15 knots. After this initial build-up and expectation the strike force was advised at 1345 to resume patrolling the eastern entrance to Leyte Gulf.

Nobody knew Kurita's battle fleet had broken off action against Sprague's carrier force at 1030 and retired northwards having been deceived into thinking he had attacked fleet carriers not slow moving light carriers and a few destroyers. Sprague's destroyers and destroyer escorts had attacked Kurita's force fiercely while laying down smokescreens. He lost four destroyers in doing so, as well as losing two light carriers sunk and two badly damaged. A timely and heavy rain squall also helped save this carrier force from further attacks.

So this 'buzz' of being used as 'decoy bait' did not eventuate. However if in fact it was to happen the thought of attacking and drawing the fire from the world's two largest battleships Yamato and Mushashi (63,000 tons), with their 18.1'' guns and greater gun range as compared to our 8'' guns was to say the least reassuring in that we were not told before we headed north, otherwise excitement would have surely changed to one of sober thought and conjecture.

At this juncture I present some interesting statistics. On 25 October 1944 from 0001-2400 the day of the Last Great Sea Battle we altered course forty-seven times: altered speed thirty-nine times and stopped four times. During the actual naval battle we altered course ten times; altered speed four times; fired our guns for twelve minutes forty seconds (opening at 0356 and ceasing at 0409 1/2 (log book record) firing thirty-two (4 to 8") gun broadsides totalling thirty tons of AP shells; 3600 meals were provided by our cooks and thankfully all our sick bay stations and damage control parties were closed up with nothing to do except wait. Yamashiro sank at 0419.

A special mention must go to our very busy and hot engine room 'Sailors'.
Not only being below decks and some below the water line and keeping steam up in our boilers but increasing, decreasing engine revolutions and stopping engines forty-three times as we altered course and prepared to fire broadsides at the enemy. The record showed that a total of 130 torpedoes were fired at the enemy ships.

Another interesting comment was made by some US ships' captains in that they were sure we were singled out by the Japanese as being a possible battle-ship not only because of the size of our silhouette but because we were using 'dirty' cordite which gave mighty gunfire flashes as opposed to US ships using flashless propellants.

Taking into consideration the size of this sea battleground of Surigao Straits, twelve to twenty-five miles wide, thirty miles long, very strong currents, the coast line interfering with the radar, the night pitch black except for burning ships and gun flashes it was surprising that out of the ninety-two vessels of all sizes moving about there were not more near collisions and other odd incidents. Eg, two US battleships nearly collided, two Japanese cruisers did collide minor damage resulting, one US destroyer shot up by both Japanese and US gunfire and an island torpedoed by the Japanese.

The final toll of loss of life and ships was:

7th Fleet - 1 destroyer damaged, 10 PTs damaged, 128 killed

Imperial JN Fleet - 2 battleships sunk, 2 cruisers sunk, 1 cruiser damaged - sunk, over 5000 killed and drowned; later 3 destroyers sunk.

Messages to the Australian Squadron. The Senior Officer Commanding the Australian Squadron Captain C.A.G. Nichols, Shropshire, Flagship.

The remainder of the day and night of the 25th was uneventful and early next day 26 October 1944 after dawn action stations, we refuelled and simultaneously provided Arunta with four torpedoes. We then patrolled the eastern entrance with Phoenix, later replaced by Nashville. At dusk, 1955, a low flying Japanese bomber dropped a torpedo which was reported by Nashville to have passed just astern of us by ten feet although not seen by our lookouts - a near miss - the aircraft then passed low over us at 200 feet and was hit by our close range weapons fire, trailing smoke as it flew landwards but no final result was observed. The 25th October 1944 was the first time that the Japanese flew their kamikaze (suicide planes) sortees to attack allied shipping.

US destroyers Mullany and Daly busy protecting us from possible sub attack, were making runs at a target area just off our port quarter and dropping patterns of depth charges - no successful results were reported.

On 27 October Shropshire and Arunta were with Task Group 77.4.1 off Mindanao and 77.4.2 off Samar, respectively. We provided close support for the escort carriers including Saginaw Bay and Chenango whilst closing up for red alerts. Our fighters shot down one Jap plane, and the sea becoming rough (35 knot winds) made it difficult for aircraft to land safely. One plane bounced as it landed hitting another into the sea, finally ending upside down.

The next few days' activity was brisk with red alerts, our fighters chasing bogeys, destroyers dropping depth charges with a positive claim of submarine sunk as oil and wreckage appeared on the surface. We were ordered to return the nintey miles to Leyte on the 29th and proceeded at 25 knots with Boise to join a protective battle fleet screen for the beachhead and our forces under Admiral Weyler in Mississippi.

The Task Group consisted of three BB, one CA, three CL and thirteen DDs. On Monday the 30th, having been closed up for some days, we passed through a typhoon of moderate intensity with a wind force of 50 knots as it passed, most of us took the opportunity to wash down and feel clean again. Both Shropshire and Arunta refuelled next morning and circled as the US ships replenished ammunition and we 'enjoyed' a breakfast of spaghetti and tea followed by a lunch of sausages and potatoes.

A group of three battleships and five cruisers screened by ten destroyers left for Seeadler Harbour whilst we remained to patrol continuously at the mouth of the gulf when at 1630 another red alert caused us to close up whilst our transport area was being bombed - no action for us.

November 1 brought more Japanese aircraft, ten Vals and Bettys closing on the fleet, some turned away when fired upon. Bogeys appeared to be all over the area making life aboard a little hectic. Two (2) Jap planes were shot down during these attacks but three of our destroyers were damaged, hit by suicide planes. Hedley blew up after burning from a kamikaze hit, and Ammen had one of her funnels crushed by a second which continued on into the sea.

Another torpedo attack missed us by 'ten feet' or so whilst the Abner Read sank in thirty minutes after being hit amidships by one of the four Vals that attacked at about 1345. One Val was shot down by our A/A fire as it passed down our port side. However, as the Abner Read blew up, its torpedoes were released travelling towards the battle fleet. All ships in the vicinity altered course rapidly and fired their close range weapons at the shallow running torpedoes hoping to explode them but to no avail - fortunately they all missed and travelled until they sank - out of fuel. We fired as they passed across our bows but the range was too awkward to observe results.

Another suicide bomber attacked Shropshire but was driven off by our X and Y turrets gunfire. A report of another Japanese fleet consisting of two BBs, three CAs, eight DDs approaching us through the Sulu Sea was received, so Captain Nichols addressed the ship's company and complimented the crew on its excellent job under trying conditions, but suggested we get as much rest as we could because of this impending battle which could occur on 2 November 1944.

Fortunately it was not to be as the Jap force supposedly landed troops on the northern end of Leyte. We left our battle disposition across Leyte Gulf south (Surigao Straits) and proceeded to San Pedro Bay to refuel from the oiler Arethusa and take on 4" and pom pom ammunition from the Liberty ship USS Murzim. We were protected by small groups of fast Lightning fighter planes.

the Newcombe and Arunta came alongside with mail much to everybody's joy but the surprise was soon dashed - it was official only. We then went into a circling patrol as other ships refuelled and ammunitioned, finally to move on station with the battleship Mississippi.

During the next few days we patrolled, suffered a little discomfort from the tail end of another typhoon of force eight winds. We were covered for the first time at night on 6th November by a Black Widow night fighter. While refuelling from the oiler Caribou a large group of enemy aircraft approached the fleet, we closed up but they were driven off by the combat air patrol losing five shot down during the engagement. We did not open fire.

Warramunga arrived on the 12th convoying ships from Hollandia and delivered some very welcome bags of mail to both Shropshire and Arunta, the first for five (5) weeks. Another seventy-six bags of mail was received from USS Columbia and Denver via LCM 21 on the 16th - 'so when it rained it suddenly poured mail bags'. Still patrolling with Arunta, Shropshire fired one 8" round from B turret at enemy aircraft. Later under way in company with Mississippi, Phoenix, Boise, Nashville and four US destroyers heading to Manus, our outer port shaft bearing decided to run hot to lock at 0900 the next day making some heavy, hot extra duty for the engine-room staff to fix the problem.

During the next five days en route to Manus and to break the monotony Mississippi exercised her main turret crews in a throw-off shoot as well as catapulting her spotting aircraft for sleeve target firing of her 5'' A/A guns and our 4" A/A guns. 'Guns' Bracegirdle was more than pleased to see our CRWs shoot down a sleeve particularly as he had requested that our Oerlikons be replaced by longer range and more powerful 40mm Bofor A/A guns.

We arrived on the 21st and refuelled and stored ship. A diesel tanker came alongside and we were pleased to find Hobart in harbour as well as seeing Gascoyne of Leyte fame enter with Louisville and Boston. We worked from 1450 to 0015 ammunitioning ship from Yunnan and then a lighter secured with the first ten of our thirteen Bofors. The single and power operated twin 20mm Oerlikon mountings were removed and transferred to Yunnan.

The American Seabees assisted by our crew quickly removed the 3'' thick timber decking from the three upper deck areas to weld the circular gun bases to our steel decks, as well as other positions not covered by timber. Shipwright Bill Marriott ably assisted by Able Seaman Jack Pitman spent the next day or so cutting in and filling the spaces around the base of each Bofor with 3" blocks. The total number of Bofor guns fitted to Shropshire was thirteen (15) making our CRW A/A capacity very effective, the range being increased from 1000 yards for the 20mm Oerlikon guns to 5000 yards for the 40mm Bofors.

We enjoyed some relief from painting ship when some new films arrived, such as 'Stage Door Canteen', 'Reap the Wild Wind', 'The Amazing Dr Chitterhouse', 'Once Upon a Time', 'Once Upon a Honeymoon', and 'Springtime in the Rockies'. We had to close up in the middle of 'Bride by Mistake' when we had a 'Flash Red for Exercise' sounded. This was to keep us on our toes.

On completion of this urgent task on the 29th a LCM barge came alongside and the next day we embarked 40mm ammunition. On 30 November a special thanksgiving service was held inShropshire with Arunta alongside. The collection of more than £100 was donated to distressed sailors and their dependents. The next day Captain Nichols, commanding the Australian Squadron, visited ships of the squadron including HMAS Yunnan.

The battleship Pennsylvania with Warramunga and USS H.L. Edwards entered harbour on 29 November 1944 and Warra came alongside Shropshire for assistance in her boiler cleaning task whilst our old friends Boise, Nashville, and Phoenix left enroute for Leyte Gulf.

On the 1 December, Arunta cast off from our side as an LS1 secured alongside with Pom Pom ammunition for our much depleted stock. USS Whitney and HMAS Birchgrove Park also secured alongside.

The port watch was given the first of our two recreational leaves ashore on Pityilu Island on 2 December and the 10th from 0750-1700 and the starboard watch was given the 3rd and the 9th on Pityilu Island.

There was plenty to do if you were prepared to make your own fun with the sporting equipment available and 'try' to drink a ration of 2+ cans of warm American beer, but the picnic day lunch made it, creating a very welcome and relaxing time. During the afternoon watch on the 3rd a carrier torpedo bomber crashed near us creating some excitement as a landing barge hurried to rescue the two-member crew.

Some of the crew tried swimming in the sea but those beautiful looking tropical islands are not always what they seem because many of us were scratched by the coral and received some nasty sores. Lieutenant (E) John Shearing made a mess of himself after climbing a coconut palm minus his shirt. Joe Barrington (radar) our watchmaker/repairer told the author to take his watch off next time 'before' he dives into the drink. The advice - it was too late, the watch was not waterproof.

Lieutenant M.J. Gregory joined Shropshire on the 7th after some frustrating weeks trying to obtain a passage north and just in time as the Australian Squadron went to sea for 4'' and CRW sleeve target firings. Port side torpedo firing to join Shropshire for exercises - across the stern of Australia and 8" calibre splash firings with Australia was undertaken. We returned to anchor and saw LSIs Manoora, Westralia and Kanimbla enter harbour. An air raid red alert saw us closed up once again.

The next few days were spent refuelling, ammunitioning, going ashore, and having an exercise 'fire in the ADP'. We watched the battleship Maryland, damaged at Leyte, come into harbour to refuel before heading for repairs at Pearl Harbour together with two cruisers also damaged at Leyte, the Nashville and the Louisville.

We all smirked a little in embarrassment as one hapless frigate Gascoyne nudged one of our port side motor boat davits and jammed it leaving our motor boat secured to the lowered boom. A floating crane lifted the damaged davit and we left our motor boat behind when we left harbour.

Commodore H.B. Farncomb DSO, MVO, RAN hoisted his broad pendant in Australia on December 1944 as Commodore, commanding the Australian Squadron relieving Captain Nichols of his duties as Commander Task Group 74.1.

Both Arunta and Warramunga had their Oerlikons removed and replaced by Bofors, having experienced the same problems as Shropshire in engaging fast diving suicide planes. The maximum effective firing range of the Oerlikons was insufficient to divert aircraft from their target. The replacement of Oerlikons with Bofors was the result in the main from Captain Nichols' report assisted by 'Guns' Bracegirdle's comments in that Oerlikons hardly had time to fire before the enemy was upon us. 'Guns' was superb as a negotiator when he approached the Americans for these 40mm A/A guns.

Captain Nichols' report for the period 21 October 1944 to 16 November 1944 regarding enemy aircraft attacks on Shropshire was as follows:
When all our different calibre guns 8'', 4'', Bofor, Pom Pom and Oerlikons were used to repel the enemy, we were attacked on 21/10 by (1) Hamp, or Frank?, fired sixteen Bofor shells, (1) Val, fired 19-4"; 22/10 (1) Sonia fired 22-4''; 23/10 (1) Dinah, fired 15-4"; 24/10 (1) Tony, fired 15-4''; 26/10 (2) Zekes, fired 12-4'' 35 Bofors, 208 Oerlikons and 46 Pom Pom; 1/11 (7) Vals (3) Bettys and 1 Nick and fired 169-4"; 518 Pom Pom, 72 Bofors, 350 Oerlikon and 2-8'' HE; 14/11 (1) Nick fired 2-8" HE.

This report of actual attacks on Shropshire and other members of the fleet does not include the many 'nuisance' raids made during this period but is indicative of the problems our radar operators had whilst cruising close to mountainous regions on three sides in San Pedro Bay and trying to locate the attackers. Similarly, air attacks occurred whilst patrolling in Leyte Gulf and the high sides of mountainous terrain again created radar detection difficulties. Taking into account other shipping in the vicinity, the mountainous terrain and Captain Nichols terming the situation as 'close waters' seemed a very appropriate definition.

Other observations as reported by 'Guns' to the captain was the staggered barrage used by our 8'' guns. It was thought that one gun fired for a range of 6000 yards and another for a range of 2500 yards was more effective than a standard barrage from both guns. Although not very accurate it proved to be very effective against aircraft attack. (Tokyo Rose reported during her broadcasts that one ship was using giant flame throwers and indicated it was those unfair Australians). Excellent air coverage was received from our carrier-based planes as the Tacloban airstrip was not yet in operation although it had been captured by US Marines.

One of the worst features of these attacks was planes rarely released their bombs or torpedoes but chose to select a target, mainly destroyers and deliberately crash dived aiming at the nerve centre of the ship, the bridge. The angle of dive varied from thirty degrees - fifty degrees but as proved, our circulating A/A screen was very effective and finally it was considered that the speed the ships were steaming at - 15 knots would have been more effective if increased to about 25 knots and our main armament coupled with ABU or radar controlled director barrage.

Those looking to starboard at the time will remember the effectiveness of one of our 8" (HE) 1 gun salvoes being fired by radar at an incoming Japanese twin engined torpedo bomber (believed to be a Betty) about to release its deadly charge after levelling off for the drop. The 8'' shell exploded above the plane breaking its wings and back and forcing it to crash into the sea. This demonstrated that large explosions were very effective some distance from the target as the concussion did the job, whereas using an Oerlikon machine gun required a succession of direct hits in most cases to disable a plane.

When drawing attention to the problems of replacing the 20mm Oerlikons with 40mm Bofors, our skipper also being Senior Officer Commanding the Australian Squadron, asked that consideration be given to providing (a) all squadron crews with three battle dress suits as the lack of regular washing and being clean was causing skin complaints as time and facilities were unavailable for regular laundry tasks, (b) cool storage was a high priority, with regard to regular supplies and storage of fresh vegetables. Arunta had reported one case of scurvy, and (c) once again the problems of regular mail deliveries.

During the December 1944 period while based in Seeadler Harbour the crew worked very hard with little rest after six weeks of battles in the Leyte Gulf operations. Shropshire was fifteen years old and her equipment required many and long hours of maintenance and restoring. Ammunitioning took long hours, with men in all departments working from early hours before dawn until well into the dogs and beyond, some into the small hours of the middle watch. The skipper reported on how well the work was carried out by the crew and with surprising goodwill and cheerfulness. He reported also on the appreciation shown by not only our own ship's company but by other ship's companies and shore bases visited regarding the well rehearsed and very effective 'Pacific Merry Go Round', ship's concert party - now changed to 'Capricorn Capers' and later to be revised and called the 'Nautical Naughties' to celebrate our victory in Tokyo Bay. Some well-known members of this group of 'Artists' were the compere, Leading Seaman 'Count' Whitby, Frank Graham and his band, three unknown midshipmen (as the Andrew Sisters), Chan Redding and his saxophone and four unknown hairy high-kicking chorus girls - what a sight to behold as they threw their legs about in gay abandon showing their all.

Much to everyone's surprise the supply ship Merkur arrived at Seeadler on the 15th to make possible our 1944 Christmas dinner of turkey, roast potatoes, seasoning, peas, cabbage, cranberry sauce, plum pudding, brandy sauce, fresh fruit and pineapple juice. Because of shortages of refrigeration space, Christmas Day was celebrated on 17 December. This clearly indicated we were not heading for Sydney and a spot of well earned leave yet.

The dinner was magnificent, the cooks excelled themselves. The officers reduced to appropriate rates were untiring workers; 'Guns' was Father Christmas - 'he arrived' appropriately wearing a tin hat above his white whiskers, long maroon dressing gown and jackboots and extending season's greetings to all, and from our two chaplains Christmas presents of an ACF parcel (Australian Comforts Fund) and a bottle of 'uncorked' Tooth's beer.

Lieutenant (Ordinary Seaman) Ken Stock played the part of the comical clown, a la monkey, distributing sweets and nuts as we ate in our very hot cafeteria. His was a magnificent effort considering the heat and humidity generated in this confined space and very hot steel decks. - He kept these gyrations up for the continuing sittings before retiring for a well deserved rest.

During the afternoon watch Leading Seaman (Commander) Oldham took charge of the sullage party consisting of Ordinary Seamen Bracegirdle, Bradley, Stock, Adams, Austin, Folk, Cooper, Kernich, Major, Wallace and Private (Major) Hodge AIF (one O.D. Griffiths went adrift) and worked them very hard, much to the delight of some lower deck observers.

The ship's band 'soon' left the cafeteria space to move through the narrow passageways to the gun room, wardroom and warrant officers' messes to pause on the quarterdeck encouraging those able to do so, to dance the 'Conga' and finished its efforts in the torpedo space.

One last act of sacrilege was the rather forlorn but hopeful 'pipe' of the day over our loud speakers (by an unknown sailor):

'All ratings on draft
Lay abaft
The after Mast
With Gas Masks
For a feed of Arse

I have never forgotten this wonderfully crude bit of seagoing humour and I might say it got a good belly laugh from most of those who heard 'it' and to conclude Christmas, carols were sung on the foc'sle during the day.

It was obvious that things were moving again - aircraft carriers were at sea screened by destroyers, transport ships and landing craft sailed to meet at our next assembly point in readiness for the next big operation.

Shropshire was the last to leave Seeadler Harbour which sparked rumours we were to join the British Pacific Fleet. Tankers were awaiting its arrival and we were refused oiling after returning from a brief foray at sea carrying out gunnery and torpedo firing exercises.

On 20 December 1944 USS Houston arrived towed by two tugs. She had been hit by torpedoes and bombs off Formosa and her stern was blown off. During the afternoon watch six aircraft carriers and twelve transports entered harbour. We were hard at a damage control exercise in the ADP and we had to close up for action stations for another air raid during all this activity.

Later that day four badly damaged US destroyers entered harbour, the USS Reno had two turrets blown away and was down by the stern whilst the others had similar damage.

On the 23rd, the harbour being virtually deserted by US warships, suddenly started to fill again as the battleships West Virginia, Tennessee; cruisers Nashville, Denver, Columbia and twenty-two other vessels, mostly destroyers entered - eg, USS Manila Bay, Tulagi, and Montpelier to mention just a few. Our old friend the destroyer Ralph Talbot was there as were our own LSIs HMAS Kanimbla and Manoora. HMAS Bungaree, mine-layer, arrived with about 1000 bags of mail, mostly second class and naval stores for all the Australian ships and tied up alongside. The Captain's requests regarding long delays in receiving mail at last paying off but first class mail would have been more welcome.

On 25 December 1944 (the real Christmas Day) after refuelling from Leopard we returned to everyone's favourite - bully beef for dinner. The Australian Squadron Shropshire and Australia, screened by three destroyers Warramunga, Arunta and the USS Nicholas sailed for Kossol Passage during which time we had 8" throw off shoots as well as long and short range A/A firings. Just before arriving in Kossol Roads our port side 4" were able to have a go at a Japanese recce plane which came in close but not close enough - the accurate gunfire drove the Jap away. The squadron arrived at our anchorage at Kossol Roads, Palau on 28 December 1944, almost out of sight of land but with ships of the invasion fleet to be seen in all directions (160 warships made up a small part of this fleet).

We refuelled during a heavy swell, bumping the tanker twice - a very sticky and dangerous problem keeping ships apart during these oiling manoeuvres - but exciting to watch as orders become sharp and explosive to make sure everyone was on his toes. We also received a quantity of 8" shells from US LC1 184 to keep up stocks of HE for bombardment purposes. We sailed for Leyte Gulf from Kossol Roads on 31 December 1944 in company with Australia, Warramunga, Arunta and Clemson, Sands and Dickerson at a speed of 20 knots. We closed up at actions stations on 1 January 1945, and our 4" opened fire on enemy aircraft - no results observed.

The new year opened with more and more warships, tankers, aircraft carriers, destroyers, transports forming up to take part in what was to be the largest fleet of ships used in an operation during the Pacific Campaign - 1000 ships of war of all shapes and sizes, escorting and carrying 280 000 troops for the landings at Lingayen Gulf, Luzon. This gives an excellent comparison to the size of the Leyte Gulf landings of 200 ships of war and 70 000 troops.

Arriving at Leyte in San Pedro Bay on 2 January 1945 we refuelled and embarked ammunition and as in the Surigao Straits naval battle, Captain Nichols took on board more 8'' and 4'' shells giving the ship well above the normal magazine holdings. The commander of the Australian Squadron, Commodore H.B. Farncomb DSO, MVO, RAN after discussion with both cruiser captains and with the concurrence of the Commander US 7th Fleet, ordered the removal of torpedoes and depth charges as there was little likelihood of them being used. Shortly after midnight, 3 January Task Group 77.2 with six old battleships, eight cruisers and forty-five destroyers met Task Group 77.4 consisting of twelve escort carriers at the northern end of Surigao Straits to form up in battle formation and proceed to Lingayen Gulf.

The combined fleet which included many unnamed small craft steamed towards Lingayen Gulf, Luzon to take part in Musketeer Mike I Operation. The minesweeping and hydrographic group were 150 miles ahead, until we closed with them near Manila Bay.

Lingayen Gulf
There was no doubt in people's minds Captain Nichols' forecast was becoming a reality - things were really hotting up. Before joining up with the main battle fleet we received correspondence from the USS Walker who came in fast and left fast as we were under attack by enemy aircraft. Our port 4" an CRW (pompom and Bofors) fired at 1910. The Jap plane crashed into the sea a minute later about 100 yards off our port beam. At 1915 we opened fire again and drove off another attacker.

The minesweeping and hydrographic group, escorted by Warramunga, including Gascoyne and Warrego were now a few miles ahead and were taking their share of Japanese aircraft attacks. Three planes attacked Gascoyne and one attacked Warrego and bombs were dropped. Gascoyne's 4" gun with its first shot at 4000 yards, hit a Japanese bomber diving vertically over Shropshire. It exploded showering Shropshire's quarter deck with debris and 4'' shell splinters and finally crashed into the sea 100 yards from Shropshire's port side at 1911. 'Complaints' were delivered to Gascoyne's captain, Lieutenant Peel 'for the mess they had made' but congratulated them for their accurate gunnery. This gives some credence to the story told by Beau Smith that he had claimed he combed shrapnel out of his hair as the planes turned away.

During the following few days numerous reports of 'bogies' were received resulting in constant closing up at action stations. In fact we closed up so often it was not always recorded in the ship's log.

On 4 January at 1717 just off Parlay, USS Ommaney Bay a CVE (light aircraft carrier) was hit by a bomb which passed through five decks. Two hours later it was decided the burning carrier was smashed - her crew abandoned ship and the US destroyers swept in and sank her with torpedoes as well as using her for target practice for their 5" guns - a sad but exciting display.

During the spate of 'bogey' reports one of the 'days' great jokes was the number of ships, including us, that opened fire at 1800 on the planet Venus which was mistaken for an enemy aircraft. As it shone brightly it appeared to all to be the glinting of sun off the metal covering of an enemy aircraft.

More air alerts on the 5th - action stations and suicide planes - Zekes or Hamps swept in fast and low to attack. Australia's third funnel was hit and one 4'' gun mounting was put out of action as well as her crane badly damaged and the radar 281 set - (there were many casualties). The Columbia was also hit by a kamikaze and retired from the scene - a battleship the New Mexico was hit on the control tower by another kamikaze. A CVE, the Manila Bay was near missed as well as the destroyer Stafford, but the heavy cruiser Louisville received a direct hit. Arunta was hit by a 'Zero' kamikaze at 1737 and had to stop for repairs, later to rejoin the fleet at 0100. (Two burials at sea took place, one on the 5th at 2200 and the other on the 6th at 0845).

Because of the increased activity by 'bogeys' in the vicinity, kamikaze attacks creating havoc and some ships being more damaged than others we remained closed up for most of the day. Our gunners were getting itchy trigger fingers and subsequently the all clear was not given until 2030 making it a hectic day for all the ship's company. Saturday 6 January came upon us with more action alarms at 0255 with bogeys at six to fifteen miles distance and orbiting at 12 miles astern of us. We closed up at action stations again.

At 0515 the cooks went to their 'action' stations to prepare a battle station breakfast - 'Struth' what a fighting breakfast - it was reported as consisting of one bottle of tomato sauce to four gallons of hot water and swimming in this messy concoction were a few thin 'streaks' of spaghetti - if you were lucky you got a piece of spaghetti - however, most were 'unlucky' and had to be satisfied or go without this 'gippery' delight. As CPO Arthur Cooper said 'if this is what the Italian Navy lived on no wonder they turned and ran away'.

At 0640 Captain Nichols gave the crew a brief talk on what was to occur in that we were to open fire at 0900 and that schedules of Fire Plans for both 8'' and 4" had been prepared by the gunnery department (Lieutenant-Commander Warwick Bracegirdle and his team of advisers).

Our target in San Fernando Bay was Poro Point, however, some confusion occurred as when we were to actually open fire - 0900 or 1110. It is more likely the time given in Chief Gunner's Mate Arthur Cooper's action recording was the correct one at 1110.

Reports indicated there were 30 enemy vessels in the harbour and a sea-plane base nearby, so plenty of action was expected. Our proposed bombardment schedule was changed from 0900 to 1045 and finally we did open fire at 1110 at a range of five miles. 'A' turret fired single gun salvoes as ranging shots.

Our spotting plane reported the enemy seaplanes, destroyed earlier by bombing runs, and a Japanese tanker was also burning in the harbour. Then a Japanese plane was sighted coming in, three attacked on the port side and all hell broke loose. We gave them all we had - 8" single gun barrages, 4'', pompom and Bofors all hammering away. The noise was ear shattering. One Jap plane crashed about 100 yards off the port beam. Our spotting plane was having difficulty in reporting the fall of shot as it was under attack and was finally shot down. A second enemy plane was shot down and crashed abreast our bridge on the port side.