Because of this air raid, the bombardment had to be temporarily discontinued and the main armament ammunition hastily changed for firing A/A barrages. The gunnery department worked smoothly with a minimum of delay and the 8'' guns opened fire within a short time of our CRWs opening fire.

There were numerous enemy aircraft flying round the fleet. Those passing us, our guns fired on and we claimed seven enemy aircraft downed but this was later reduced to three as most ships fired at the same aircraft and claimed their part in the victories. Even in wartime sharing was part of life. Special mention should be given to the three main attacks that occurred during early afternoon and later, on 6 January 1945.

These three attacks are samples of the many kamikaze attacks we drove off. They were to say the least, the closest most of us had seen. They were near things for many at their action stations on the upper deck, not to say any more frightening than for those below decks depending on Lieutenant Brewster's broadcasting of what was occurring.

The first at 1200 was a kamikaze coming in at about 300 mph from astern. It passed Australia - already damaged by kamikazes -and appeared to be coming at us at masthead height. However, accurate CRW fire from our quarter deckhand starboard side Bofors deflected the plane (a Val), and the starboard pompom with its eight barrels captained by Leading Seaman Pat Sheridan finished the job. Its tail assembly was blown away completely, It did not crash but weaved in a drunken fashion to disintegrate into the New Mexico instead of the sea.

New Mexico's crew quickly had their hoses going to put out the fire. AB Peter Muhlhan admitted that the quarterdeck Bofor's gun crew were indeed pleased to see the Val go past instead of using the quarterdeck as a landing field. A few minutes later another dive-bomber came in and 'dropped its bomb to explode on the starboard side creating the illusion we had been torpedoed. At 1205 another kamikaze came in from the port side out of the sun heading for the bridge at 350 mph.

The captain ordered all personnel including the fore control, ADP and directors to clear the bridge. An organised stampede headed for the starboard ladders, but this time two able seamen, the author, captain's starboard EBI operator and Rex Halliday fore control inclinometer operator failed to hear the instruction and remained at their posts.

With our forward and port side Bofors and pompom firing and our 4'' and 8'' guns firing a barrage the noise was at its maximum - a deafening racket. It was then that both Nicholls and Halliday experienced a sensation of some quietness amidst the noise - looking quickly to port they saw a Japanese aircraft sweeping in to miss the ship by inches. Its wing dipped so low according to Nicholls, that it dropped below the bridge level between the bridge and 'B' turret to plummet into the sea and within several yards of the starboard side, opposite the bridge. The A/A fire hitting the kamikaze provided some souvenirs for the crew - Arthur Cooper still has his piece of metal and added his thoughts to the episode, you could have touched the plane with your hand. Well, Nicholls certainly could have except he ducked to avoid what he thought was to be his decapitation. Captain of No. 2 Bofor on top of 'B' Turret, Kevin Day said it was a close .... but shooting it down was his main task.

He was still there when 'Guns' Bracegirdle returned and thinking he was hit asked if he was all right - Nicholls stood up feeling quite shaky. Rex Halliday's eyes were so wide he claims he still has a photographic memory of this near miss that came so near to killing us and wiping the upper part of the bridge and its crew out.

Chief Gunners' Mate Arthur Cooper further recorded that when the plane crashed, its burning petrol plus sea water splashed over the 4" gun deck and other CRW gun crews - nobody was burnt but the many pieces of duralumin from the aircraft were picked up and put aside as souvenirs.

The third episode of the day occurred at 1829. We were steaming off Poro Point, having just completed a bombardment, when another kamikaze came in diving from 7000 feet at a sixty degrees angle and moving very fast just off our port quarter.

The port pompom crew, captained by Leading Seaman Roy Cazaly, was in the process of reloading after a very hectic day of A/A firings, when urgent calls came in reporting this attacker from several positions. Dave Birrell from the signals platform and Tiny Mooney yelling from the 4'' gun deck as well as the fire direction officer. Roy Cazaly leapt to his controls and with the kamikaze in his sight, fired his eight barrels - the sound of 'galloping horses' caused by the rippling gunfire of the eight barrels was music to our ears (the Yanks called our Pom Poms, 'Chicago Pianos') as its two pound shells blew the plane to pieces. The wings were shot off, then the tail, until only the pilot and engine and bomb strapped beneath were left coming towards us.

Cazaly continued firing until the plane disintegrated. One half splashed down on each side of the ship. When the engine and attached bomb or mine hit the water close to our port quarter the frightening 'thumps' was felt by all, especially those below decks. The superstructure up to the ADP, gun directors and elsewhere were deluged with water. This act of calm, deliberate action by Leading Seaman Cazaly earned him the award of a DSM.

Reports of whether one or two crew were aboard the aircraft are debatable. Arthur Cooper's recording and others reporting the finale indicate that one was blasted out of the aircraft at about 500 feet in his parachute but before reaching the sea he slipped from his parachute to drop into the sea never to be seen again. There were some cries to Cazaly - 'shoot the bastard' this did not occur and nor was it necessary.

During this very busy afternoon Australia was hit again and her 4'' gun deck put out of action. A short time later our 4" guns crews and CRWs opened fire followed by our 8'' barrage firing at oncoming enemy aircraft which were endeavoring to keep the sun at their backs and although trying to weave, some crashed into the sea - but with all ships firing, very few could lay claim to positive 'kills'. There were rumours the Japs had perfected a system to follow in on our own IFF signals but this was never proved.

More bogeys were shot down well astern of us and because the Australia's A/A capacity had been reduced to CRWs after her second hit by a kamikaze Val she was moved in between two US battleships for protection. After this last attack a feeling of quiet reigned. Most felt we had done a good day's work, and at 1908 the action cooks were summoned to the galleys but it did not remain quiet for long. It was during these hectic days that Midshipman John Francis developed his skills as the ship's 'scribe' reporting all our actions, near misses, etc with near as possible perfect accuracy - some of these are given space in H. Gill's history of the R.A.N.

Five bogeys were reported coming in from astern but gladly they faded out and at 2040 we reverted to second degree of readiness. During all this hectic A/A activity Shropshire was straddled by a 6'' gun shore battery so 'Guns' quickly ordered 'A' and 'X' directors to stand by to clear guns.

The guns cleared we opened fire at 1249 after locating the shore battery with the help of our spotting aircraft from the cruiser Minneapolis and moved into range at 8000 yards. The 4" also joined and engaged the shore battery with our 8" and on completion of the bombardment the shore battery appeared to be out of action. Buildings were on fire and oil tanks burning with large clouds of black smoke billowing into the sky. The spotting plane reported no further movement in the area. We moved to sea at 1520 to join forces with others of the Fleet to return later for further bombardments about 1600 and at a range of 4000 yards fired at buildings which we obliterated just left of a lighthouse.

Later, another bogey came in which was shot down whilst we fired at a second intending to attack a battleship. Our Bofors were using their longer range to great effect - more bogeys came in and all ships were firing, shrapnel falling over a large area. It is always amazing that many of our people were not injured or killed by our own shrapnel. At 1758 our 4'' went into action firing at another group of bogeys and the comment by Arthur Cooper told the story. At 1759 he reported 'He's down, he's up, he's blown up, he was only feet above the water'. The 4'' ceased firing at 1804. It was recorded that by 1904 Shropshire had extended 64 - 8" on bombardment, 26 - 8'' on barrage and 471 - 4" for both A/A and bombardment. (No record of the CRWs kept). We proceeded to the open sea to cruise off Lingayen Gulf overnight for our own safety and for manoeuvrability to await the next day's scheduled bombardments.

Even before the bombardment group re-entered the gulf on 7 January 1945 we were closed up at 0425 because six bogeys were again reported coming at us using the bright moonlit night to silhouette targets. One was shot down just ahead of us. Although we were closed up at action stations the bogeys all round the fleet kept their distance although one did penetrate our fighter cover. At this time our mine sweepers were still operating close inshore with their under- water demolition teams.

Shropshire approached the San Fabian beachhead with two targets under consideration, Bauang six miles south of San Fernando and Damartis but finally we were ordered to stand by seven miles north, off Damartis, a town where 6'' gun batteries were placed.

We used 'B' turret only for the bombardment whilst 'A' and 'Y' were loaded with barrage shell in case of enemy aircraft attacks. The ship steamed in and opened fire at 1114 at 15 900 yards hitting visual targets of trucks, buildings and the railway station. 'X' turret range taker reported gun flashes from a large camouflaged gun battery including a large group of people moving about.

Bogeys coming in from the land prevented attacking this target at this time but 'X' turret fired five rounds at a hills target at a range of 7000 yards to protect the minesweeper's underwater demolition team who were in danger themselves from shore-based attackers.

Later 'X' turret fires twenty rounds at 8700 yards. Single gun salvoes were fired at a little house apparently concealing a gun. At 1546 'X' turret reported shore batteries firing at us - several shots fell just astern of Shropshire another ahead, and several more fell around the ship. We opened fire with 'X' turret again increased speed from 2 knots to 10.5 knots altered course to starboard and expended fourteen HE shells. Australia although badly damaged was still in action giving support to destroying these buildings and shore batteries.

Our eight inch turrets ceased firing at a range of 11 800 yards but we were shot at again and our 4'' took over at 1655 as we moved closer to shore. The longer range Bofors also opened fire on some shore targets but no results were observed from the fall of Bofor shells as the jungle growth concealed the fall of shot. More and more bogeys were coming in but some of the groups of bogeys turned out to be friendly fighters who turned back the second group of enemy planes, one of which crashed into the sea but was not identified. We ceased firing at shore targets at 1720 but opened fire again at 1815 against enemy aircraft continuing until 1900 and even though bogeys were reported every- where, coming in, moving away, we moved into our night disposition steaming out of Lingayen Gulf to the open sea. A near collison with a minesweeper caused an emergency 90 degrees turn at 2008 - this finally topped off an exciting day and at 2010 we reverted to second degree of readiness.

Shropshire moved into Lingayen Gulf again on the 8th to be met with increasing reports of bogeys although we had become slightly accustomed to these reports as our radar teams were reporting them all night at varying distances from five up to ten miles. Action cooks were mustered to prepare 'scran' at 0546 and we hardly had time to digest this fare when the second degree of readiness converted to action stations. It was still dark but the bright moonlight turned the area into an eerie light - we couldn't see anything.

At 0716 three kamikazes dived down at us followed by US Wildcat fighters. Our 8'' barrage, 4'', Bofors and Pom Poms opened fire. The gunfire and the screaming roar of the fighter planes was deafening. One of the Japanese Val dive-bombers passed down our starboard side with a Wildcat fighter on his tail blazing away. Those on the bridge and those who heard will never forget the words of the excited American pilot who yelled over the intercom something like 'keep on shooting, forget me, shoot the Goddam bastard down', etc.

Shropshire not only helped to shoot the Val down but also shot the Wildcat out of the sky. Both planes flew through a hail of two pounder shells from our star- board pompom as well as the accurate Bofor fire earlier as they both passed close. Captain Nichols was very concerned as to the fate of the US fighter pilot and followed the incident and its ending to a satisfactory finale. The pilot was picked up by a destroyer and to everybody's amazement suffered only a broken hip after having his plane shredded and crashing into the sea alongside us at about 350 mph.

Soon after this another kamikaze crashed within 200 yards of our port side whilst another, a Dinah or Betty shot down by our port pompom hit the Australia at the waterline which required flooding of compartments to correct her 5 degrees port list. Another attempt by a Dinah kamikaze only slightly damaged the Australia on her port quarter. Further reports came in from Australia - one of her 4'' guns was put back into action but unfortunately under local control (her radar 281 set was out of action) and it was also reported by Chaplain Alcorn that the two previous attacks had resulted in forty crew being killed and fifty wounded - a sad day for the crew of Australia and the RAN.

As an aside there were some minor comments from the crew about the state of each others cleanliness - after 2 1/2 days of being closed up and no washing facilities most were beginning to smell and it was with some pleasure we were given a short time to wash even though it was with sea water - worse of course for those cooped up in their radar/radio shacks and gunnery directors and worse still for the engine room staff in the boiler and engine room area.

With our bows pointing towards the San Fabian (beachhead) Shropshire and Australia moved into position for bombardment with the two US battleships just ahead and already firing, New Mexico was on our starboard bow and California on our port bow a most impressive sight and sound.

At 1034 our 4" joined in with the battleships and commenced bombardment resulting in two Jap aircraft being hit and destroyed on the beach and as well our 4'' bombarded targets at the mouth of the Bued River. An hour later our 8'' opened fire (twenty rounds) starting two fires and hitting the San Fabian railway station and following the railway lines with ten yard corrections with direct hits from our last two salvoes. These results were confirmed by our spotting plane. We kept firing at San Fabian town with instructions to raze the buildings in preparation for the 'S' day landing on the 9th. Our 4" opened fire and made a direct hit on a pill box.

click to enlarge

At about noon, after all the action was completed, dinner was served - stew and peas with prunes to follow. Just to finish his day, Chan, one of our musicians had a minor calamity when he spilled some down the hatchway much to his disgust. Just before our afternoon shoots at selected targets the minesweepers swept ahead of us bringing to the surface several mines missed on the earlier sweep. They were exploded by rifle fire. It indicates how lucky we were to have the services of the minesweepers - who themselves were under heavy fire - in that we avoided hitting those mines during the first sweep.

'A' turret was ordered to stand by while the New Mexico and California fired at inland targets with their 14'' guns. We later opened fire (sixteen rounds) and observed direct hits on trenches and gun emplacements. A further three salvoes using 'K' shell from 'A' turret at a range of 5600 yards saturated the target area and the 4" and 8" results were confirmed by the spotting aircraft.

It was interesting to observe the two battleships firing, one using phosphorus anti-personnel air burst shells which explode above the trees bursting into a white ball of smoke with long streams of red lumps of burning phosphorus falling to ground like tentacles of an octopus. It has been reported these shells caused large numbers of casualties. We ceased bombardment in the San Fabian area to steam northwards to engage more shore batteries which were attacking our survey ships and minesweepers in the San Fernando area.

After resting in second degree of readiness we again closed up at action stations at 1708 for main armament bombardment. 'Y' turret opened fire at a range of 16 400 yards at a shore battery on Poro Point. This turret's second two-gun salvo was a direct hit on one gun emplacement and after changing target we straddled the second gun emplacement. The spotting aircraft reported all enemy shore batteries guns destroyed. Later another shore battery fired on our minesweepers and again we opened fire and destroyed these guns as well as an ammunition dump although we were competing with the battleships on this target.

We again shifted target to the eastern side of San Fernando Bay to see large flames from whatever we destroyed. We ceased fire at 1834 but the final reports of our bombardments were unsatisfactory due to poor visibility. The spotting aircraft reported some enemy transports sheltering in a secluded bay at 1845. We were ordered to stand out to sea due to more bogeys reported coming in at fifteen miles then eight miles, then five miles. One passed down our port side at 2000 but it was unsighted by our close range weapons crews because of failing light. We reverted to second degree of readiness and formed cruising disposition for the night with other ships of the fleet to await the next day's troop landings.

The next morning - 9 January 1945 - we were awakened by radar reports of bogeys coming in and the action cooks going to their galleys.

As first light crept over the horizon we saw the invasion force of troopships stretching as far as the eye could see - hundreds of vessels of every type. Shropshire formed on the battleships Calfornia and New Mexico which opened fire (with four other battleships of the Idaho and New Jersey class) to commence the bombardment for 'S' day at 0705. When our turn came at 0830 our 8'' fired on specified targets in the San Fabian area, 'it was one of the most intensive bombardments ever witnessed (Commodore Farncomb)'. Overhead, protecting us, were hundreds of Army and Navy fighters giving us plenty of support chasing away several very close enemy bogeys.

The original fleet, totalling 2000 ships, had increased by hundreds more. The landing barges were lowered from their parent vessels to take on their troops, to circle the ships either side until all was ready to head to shore and attack what was left of the Japanese positions. When the bombardments ceased after lasting two hours approximately, the landing began. We ceased fire at 1150 after more than three hours firing at selected targets using 500 8" and 400 4" shells at a range of 8000 yards.

This was an exciting operation with ships bombarding, unloading troops and equipment, aircraft overhead, and huge clouds of smoke and dust rising from the shore making visibility very hazy. It was a thrilling sight - never to be forgotten. At 0925 the first wave of barges landed. The second wave passed just astern of us and I think most sailors were waving and yelling 'all the best' but thinking thank God it's them and not us.

Before the actual landings took place we witnessed the rather awesome firing from the rocket ships. This bombardment allowed the troops to land on all beaches within about ten minutes - an amazing co-ordinated Navy/Army operation. Our LSIs Manoora, Kanimbla and Westralia were sighted moving into their beach landing areas. We then switched targets to fire at main roads, cross roads at 10 000 yard range, including block houses on the main road to Binday from San Fabian. Later fire was renewed on another shore battery with our 4" to demolish the area and when the guns stopped shooting with our 4" smoke was pouring into the sky above the area.

The spotting aircraft then directed us to fire at the railway junction and store houses at a range of 10 000 yards. Our first salvo landed twenty-five yards from the railway track. After destroying this area we opened fire at 13 000 yards and scored direct hits on the centre of the town of San Jacimo - about three miles south of San Fabian. Our task completed we ceased fire, for a well deserved but brief rest.

The troops meanwhile had met with little resistance during the beach landings and after nearly 3 hours of moving inland, the 'Japanese' hoisted a white flag above one of the few remaining buildings in San Fabian. At 1305 action alarms were sounded as three kamikaze came in - one near missed a destroyer and plunged into the sea, a second hit the battleship Mississippi and the third, a 'Tony', hit the Australia's foremost funnel which folded half way down.

The story soon circulated - our radar operator reported the bogeys as enemy aircraft whilst the Australia reported them as friendly and she was hit - we were surely the 'lucky' ship. After this hectic few hours and regardless of bogeys in the vicinity, a small interlude occurred which allowed us to witness nine Martin Mariner flying boats coming into land but this was to be a short lived break, at 1610 we were called on to give fire support to the US Marines attacking the town of Manaog, a distance of nine miles.

We ceased fire at 1709 with another job well done only to open fire again at enemy aircraft at 1834 - little rest for the crew was the order of times in Lingayen Gulf. Lingayen airfield was taken intact and later the Marines secured the town of Lingayen with one might say, 'minimum effort with minimum losses'. Commodore Farncomb decided on the 9th to transfer his broad pendant to Shropshire sending Australia escorted by Arunta to Leyte (San Pedro Bay) on her way south for repairs. She sailed in company with Louisville, Columbia and twelve destroyers. We were not in the vicinity and the commodore was to transfer to Shropshire on 22 January 1945.

HMAS Arunta returned with Commodore Farncomb when it was considered feasible to make the destroyer fit for further operational duties with help of the repair ship Midas. She was later to undergo usual periodic major refit in Sydney.

On the 10th we closed up at action stations to 'enjoy' another hearty breakfast having to contend with three bogeys attacking the fleet at a distance of eight miles. The A/A fire was again covering the sky and not one of the enemy planes survived, they were shot down in the vicinity of our transports.

The battleships were using their searchlights to check small craft movements close to shore and suspected to be MTBs - one was shot at and blown up by the secondary armament of a battleship. Another bogey was shot down and fell close to our bows. Tracer shells were everywhere as a second bogey was reported coming in three miles dead astern of us. Our after 'gopher' fired as it tried to hit one of our US escorting destroyers but the kamikaze, a Val, was deflected by the gunfire and plunged into the sea - four of our fighters were also firing as they followed the Val to its end.

It was about 0800 with smoke limiting visibility except for overhead, when reports came in that Japanese swimming with rafts out loaded with grenades and limpet mines were in the area. We were issued with submachine guns and instructed to fire at anything floating close to the ship's side that may conceal a swimmer. However, it was not only swimmers but MTBs and possibly midget submarines were another danger. At least, for those amongst the gun crews who had not actually pulled a trigger, their opportunity came quickly and every coconut, box or piece of vegetation received a burst of machinegun fire. Even later, when in a closed up situation of second degree of readiness and later still closed up at defence stations, most guns crew 'enjoyed' the chance to shoot at a suspected Japanese.

It was reported that several Japanese, with bundles attached to their backs, were blown up as they approached our destroyers so, in effect, our machine- gunners were playing the game safe rather than being sorry later.

The remainder of that day, apart from numerous bogey reports and closing up, was fairly quiet except for a call from the US Marines held up in the San Fabian area. We answered the call, to steam in at 25 knots and open fire at 1631 at a range of seven miles with four gun salvoes. We ceased firing at 1643. The first salvo was reported by the shore control party to be a direct hit and we again received a 'very well done, congratulations' from Captain Nichols to the TS crew and director.

At 1800 the action cooks were called and we closed up at dusk action stations but at 1830 we opened fire at high flying bogeys. More bogeys were about and A/A fire was very heavy to see one more enemy aircraft crash into the sea. As light was failing rather rapidly we viewed the numerous fires in San Fernando as the town burned after a big air strike but the actual finale occurred when a huge explosion was heard and observed at Poro Point. Captain Nichols informed us we were to join with Admiral Halsey's carrier force and patrol between the gulf and Mindinao.

We were of course still under the overall command of Admiral Oldendorf's fleet and were abreast of the 6'' gun cruiser Boise during this patrol. Still the night was not to be overly quiet - at 2250 we closed up again at action stations to be ready to fire at bogeys passing overhead heading south - no action by us.

The 0630 dawn phase to the dusk phase at 1840 was very quiet as we patrolled in a fairly heavy sea but we had a good view of the awesome sight of millions of rounds of tracer shells weaving a pattern of lines in the night sky as more bogeys passed above us heading for the transport and beach area. They were too high to observe any hits but, if it did nothing else, it must have unsettled the Japanese pilots from effectively carrying out their kamikaze role. Five minutes later we heard the rumble of the gunfire as the night sky slowly darkened - the unmistakable sound of exploding bombs finalised this night of anti-aircraft barrage.

During this period that Tokyo Rose was reporting that the Australian heavy cruisers Shropshire and Australia had fitted a new deadly weapon that was smashing the Japanese aircraft like tissue paper in the sky. There was no doubt that this could appear to the Japanese pilots to be true. Actually it was Shropshire's 8'' barrage firing which caused the report.

When the 8'' were fired as A/A guns the belching of flames followed by smoke and the eventual detonation of the shell set for barrage firing would appear to the Japanese pilots to be a giant 'flame thrower' with the ability to 'pluck' an aircraft from the sky. Australia did not use their 8'' as A/A guns, as they, unlike Shropshire, were not fitted with barrage directors. This whole incident of reporting by Tokyo Rose may explain why both our heavy cruisers received more than our fair share of attention by the Japanese kamikazes. We were lucky, Australia was not, she was hit five times by suicide planes. During the first watch with Captain Nichols on the bridge, we cruised in battle formation with cruisers Minneapolis and Portland screened by our destroyers. It was to protect our landing forces from a possible Japanese fleet attack but this did not eventuate and coupled with the rough seas, most of the crew were relieved to enjoy a reasonable night's rest although not quite a 'rest and recreation' situation.

Friday, 12 January 1945 saw the ship closed up at action stations at 0615 and all appeared quiet until our radar picked up bogeys closing at thirty miles range at 0930. Fortunately our combat fighters closed to intercept and shoot down four. Only two came close enough for our Bofors to engage, fire and drive them off.

All through the morning bogeys were reported. One group of about forty enemy aircraft was reported by our radar as heading for the transport landing areas but again they were headed off by our carrier-based fighters. At approximately 1130 the all clear was given and with this brief respite most of the crew relaxed until again bogeys were reported in the vicinity at 1250 at a range of five miles. The enemy could still penetrate regardless of the effectiveness of our radar, and so the ADP lookouts were still required to be on their 'toes' at all times. The bridge lookouts with their more powerful binoculars reported they had seen dogfights at a range of about thirty miles but could not identify which planes were shot down.

The all clear was given but the fleet remained in its battle disposition until we refuelled at 1500 the next day from the oiler Schuykell under way at a speed of 8 knots. In these rough conditions of the boiling seas between ships, the stokers handling the oil hoses had a tough job. Ships rolled in opposite directions and the slack in the bights of oil hoses were stretched to a dangerous limit. A breakage could have meant the loss of fuel as well as the hose. The job was completed at 1830 as dusk was approaching. Because of the danger of enemy attacks the ship's gun crews were closed up and when the searchlights were sighted it was indeed a relief to the captain, navigator and gunnery officer to be able to move away with freedom to manoeuvre.

The seas remained rough for the next few days and there were only spasmodic radar reports of bogeys in the vicinity. However, our gun crews and lookouts could not let up their vigilance. They became bleary-eyed whilst glued to their binoculars. The fleet was very well protected with air cover from Admiral Halsey's carriers and no one can doubt the bravery and the guts shown by these Navy pilots in taking off and landing on their pitching flight decks. Many planes were damaged and became write-offs as well as being blown over the side as they endeavoured to land on their heaving flight decks.

At this time Shropshire was ploughing through waves twenty to thirty feet high and it was thrilling to see battleships smothered from stem to stern with boiling seas as they lifted to plunge bows first into the waves. They looked like giant submarines with only their superstructure showing above water like huge conning towers. We had more than our share of 'greenies' over our bows and a freeboard of thirty feet indicated height of these waves. When the ship turned 180 degrees she rolled very heavily especially when we were broadside on. One 'galah' opened a port side scuttle in the cafeteria just as we rolled into the wave and water spurted in under great pressure and blasted all the food trays off the table and soaking a few sailors who were not amused. The culprit was 'apparently unknown' but I am sure if CPO Otto Smith (cafeteria manager) knew who it was, he would have been doing 'Jankers' for weeks and the cafeteria was not the best place to work in, it was close to the boilers and very hot and sticky.

The captain informed the crew that kamikazes never played favourites by attacking only little people - they attacked a battleship with General MacArthur and his staff aboard. It was a close encounter, one of the general's senior officers was killed. In another incident Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, Commander of the British Pacific Fleet was on boardNew Mexico when she stopped a Zombie. Was it just a chance attack or did the Japs know the C-in-C was on board? After enduring the previous few days of rough seas and uncomfortable quarters, Shropshire re-entered Lingayen Gulf on the 18th and saw the end of rolling, pitching and tossing, and unwell sailors. She anchored in smooth waters near the landing beach at the eastern entrance of the Patalan River. Ship movements were constant all that day with LC1s laying smokescreens and bogey reports turning our defence stations into action stations with Captain Nichols reminding us to close up fast and not be complacent as it was not over yet. During the Lingayen operation we had expended 979 (4") rounds as well as (8").

The moonlit night allowed us to see the results of our bombardments coupled with the continuing Army attacks. Fires were still burning, the noise of the battles ashore carried clearly over the waters as the Marines advanced up to 32 miles as they headed for Manila on a fifteen-mile front.

The ship closed up again on the 19th at 0200 to hear the all-clear at 0235 well before dawn action stations. The shore based A/A gunners had opened fire and stirred the pot so another early morning sleep disturbance occurred for some of the crew who vented their wrath with profanity because they were soon to be on duty for the first watch.

The dawn phase close up was coupled with laying a smoke screen along the coast to protect supplies being landed but the all clear to stand down was not given until after dusk. It was a slow and boring day except for those who knew what was happening. Lieutenant Brewster was, however, keeping us up to date as best as he could with the little information available.

The morning of Saturday the 20th was quiet, but during the afternoon we had more reports of bogeys at eight miles and at forty miles, coming in fast, but nothing eventuated except for closing up at action stations with men moving at the double, heading forward on the starboard side and aft on the port side. This was Lieutenant-Commander Henry Cooper's system and was one of the most sensible which proved that simple instructions made for the safety of the crew and prevented injuries.

During the afternoon destroyers were bombarding with single gun salvoes in support of the Marines. Just after dusk action stations smokescreens were again laid by the destroyers; the black smoke eventually blending with white smoke to create a dirty grey effect. This was to confuse and hopefully prevent the enemy aircraft from harassing our ships, but enemy aircraft came again at 2035. Action Stations, searchlights picking up the aircraft, guns firing but the planes escaped - the all clear was given an hour later. During these few days, some pieces of equipment were lost in the excitement - two (2) pistols signal 1'' Mk III were reported missing and later one pistol revolver, one case pistol and one belt waist. After a few days of enquiries etc, one of our more popular officers received an admonishment for the loss of one pistol however, eventually through what could be called a miracle, and twelve days later the quarter- master found one pistol revolver, one case pistol and one belt waist in good order on his desk.

To keep the damage control teams up to scratch a 'For Exercise Only' was carried out on the 19th, under the direction of Lieutenant-Commander Cooper - ie, 'Fire in the Emergency Conning Position'. Even though the exercise was conducted efficiently and was very effective, most of those who were not involved were not Impressed with being disturbed from their 'rest and recreation'. Sailors running around dragging hoses, etc, and telling them to get out of the way in rather abrupt and or rude language was not appreciated.

The next two to three days passed reasonably quiet, Sunday 21st, the day of rest was just that, not a shot fired in anger. A few bogeys were reported during dawn action stations but were too far away to bother us. In the distance we heard the destroyer gunfire supporting the Army at selected targets in the hills. A pleasing report came from Yunnan that she had taken on board 400 x 8'' quarter-charges and shells from Australia before she moved south for major repairs and these replenished Shropshire's magazines.

When Arunta arrived from Leyte at 1435 on 22 January 1945, Commodore HB Farncomb DSO, MVO, RAN and his operational and administration staff came on board and his Broad Pendant was hoisted in Shropshire at 1530. The usual musical chairs - swapping cabins occurred again and some of the grizzles gave the sailors a modicum of humorous relief. However, apart from a bit of physical labour the lower deck crew were rarely disturbed. Arunta also brought with her forty-two bags of mail - mainly second class but greatly appreciated by the ship's company and at least it cheered up a few of the crew. The remainder of January was quiet except for several red alerts and the usual radar reports of bogeys coming in and moving away although we always closed up at action stations.

We saw the battleships New Mexico and Colorado put to sea, escorted by destroyers - an LCT arrived to deliver supplies of some Bofor ammunition and to take off empty 4'' shell cases. (We saved ours as opposed to the USN who let theirs go over the side as expendable and indeed safer for the crew to prevent accidents - we always thought 'will we never learn' that men are more important than saving 4'' shell cases, etc).

Also during the Lingayen assault we took aboard twenty-one British soldiers from the East Surrey Regiment, prisoners--of war released by the US Marines who captured the POW Camp before the Japanese could put the prisoners to the sword. (These prisoners were transferred from Singapore only five months before our attack.) The poorly fed and emaciated men were soon in good spirits. They thanked their saviours - the American Rangers and later the crew of Shropshire for the good food prepared for them (roast pork excluding of course the rice pudding from the menu) and being attended by our excellent sick bay team.

The sick bay team worked very long hours carrying out a medical examination of the ship's company to ascertain what percentage were suffering from boils and pustular complaints. Some twenty-eight percent were found to be badly affected and it was not surprising as the food was in the main, canned and dehydrated, mostly unappetising and obviously of poor quality as it failed to give us the nutrition required to keep us healthy. More and more sailors were being painted with multi-coloured Gentian Violet antiseptics to ease the irritation and hopefully cure the sores.

One most interesting comment about food relates to a family friend Lieutenant (E) John Shearing, who used to say how boring it was to be served poultry every day. I replied very quickly, I'll swap my next meal of bully beef with you, needless to say he backed off as I would have in his position. To most sailors the meals of bully beef served in cold serves, as rissoles, in stews, as fritters plus dehydrated vegetables were more than boring. The wastage level was fairly high except for the fritters because the other dishes were not only visually unappetising but lacked the mouth-watering desire to eat.

Commodore Farncomb, after recovering from old and painful shrapnel wounds and a few days rest, inspected the ship's company at divisions and commented: 'it is an honour that HMA ships Shropshire, Australia, Arunta, and Warramunga should have formed part of the vanguard of the Lingayen operation' as well as Gascoyne, Warrego and ML316 being in the forefront of the minesweeping and hydrographic group. He added his criticism on our poor mail deliveries and emphasised the need of them being improved. The fleet post office, he said was obviously not aware of the location of front line combatant ships.

Captain Nichols also commented that as the Lingayen Gulf operations eased the crew were also reacting in a lethargic way which was not easy to counteract. The hectic battle days had created an understandable tension in the crew and a period of leave down south would be one way of increasing morale. We all showed signs of 'let's go south' and seeing Minneapolis going to sea, it was pleasing to hear that not only the lower deck were a little lax. One of our officers received a blast for not being where he was supposed to be. To get our minds back on our jobs the captain decided to ginger us up and called for an 'Exercise Fire on the Bridge'. Once again Lieutenant-Commander Cooper and his damage control group swung into action and disturbed a lot of people who would have preferred peace and quiet.

Hoses were hanging off the bridge superstructure, crew dashing up and down ladders and not, I may add, moving forward on the starboard side and aft on the port side as prescribed by their damage control chief 'Henry' When it was all over things returned to normal - radar reported more bogeys and we closed up at action stations as the enemy aircraft were chased off by our fighters. After dusk stand-to on 31 January 1945 (a moonlit night) another bogey was reported by radar and resulted in action stations for another twenty minutes. When all clear was given two-thirds of the crew were trying to find somewhere comfortable to 'crash' whilst closed up and preparing for the next call 'action stations'.

During this lull reminiscence was the order of the day. Jack Metcalf said one of the most dangerous periods of the ship's life during the Lingayen Gulf bombardment was the kamikaze attacks. The after HA 4'' gun director manned by some intrepid sailors such as PO Ted Mitchell the control officer, (who as an aside took over from Lieutenant 'Dusty' Rhodes CGM of HMS Kelly fame) and was awarded his DSM for his good work and devotion to duty as well as looking after and training his team, Jack Metcalf the direction layer; Norm McCurry director trainer; Dicky Bird, range taker and Dasher Beale the communicator whilst being cooped up in this very restrictive hot metal box with little hope of getting out if they were hit. Jack Metcalf relates one of his more scary moments as a kamikaze came in and how they all thought 'this is it' - fortunately it was shot down by our A/A fire. There was one advantage he said - they were high up and could see it all. Jack reminded me that the suicide planes were called 'Zombies' as it was unknown in the early stages what the Japanese pilots were up to when they flew in to crash deliberately into the ship's sides and superstructure. It turned out the Japanese did not start using suicide planes until after sixty-six cities had been fire-bombed and because the war was not going their way they resorted to the divine wind to save them - the kamikaze.

Our 'Chief Buffer' CPO Bill Minton an 8'' gun turret captain, was also involved in Shropshire's role in helping sink Yamashiro, one of the Japanese battle- ships during what is now called the 'Last Great Sea Battle' in the Surigao Straits during the Philippines campaign. It had to be a very satisfying experience; closed up in a steel box with broadside after broadside shuddering the ship to find on completion and cease-fire a sight of burning enemy warships with no damage to us. AB Peter Muhlhan one of the 'After Gophers' gun crew or more commonly called 'Arse end Charlie' or No 15 Bofor to be correct relates his story of the uncomfortable days at action stations right on the stern of our heavy cruiser.

The Fire Direction Officer (FDO) Commander (S) R.F. Hatherall, always on the ball, and enthusiastic as No 15 Bofor had a near 360 degree circle of fire to consider except for dead ahead, constantly advised the Bridge of the presence of bogies and attacking aircraft. The Captain of the Gun, Petty Officer Ken Hill, Leading Seaman Joe Bacon, A.B. Maxwell, John Corcoran and Peter Muhlhan fed the commander with a steady stream of reports to pass on - so it was to prove an example of a well co-ordinated team trained by PO Ken Hill. The FDO was later awarded his DSC.

This particular day Shropshire was firing at enemy targets ashore in Lingayen Gulf with 'Y' turret's guns at a very low angle and pointing dead astern while No. 13 fired at an approaching enemy aircraft. The blast of gunfire was an enormous thump, not a bang, followed by a great rush of smoke. It was then the after gopher's crew wondered what had hit them, everybody was reeling about stunned - Maxwell standing higher loading the Bofor, with little protection from the shield, was nearly knocked unconscious lying back over the ammunition box while his steel helmet was blown overboard, Ken Hill was, as the rest of us, thrown about and bruised by the protuberances of the gun mounting. Surgeon Lieutenant Kerr-Grant was quickly on the job taking Maxwell to the sick bay assisted by SBA Trevor Smart.

Other gun crews all around the ship had varying degrees of effects from our 8'' firing especially those directly above or below and behind the gun blasts - there was no escape as the shields to be effective had to be minimal allowing the guns to be 100 percent operative with a maximum arc of fire.

One of our port side Bofors just abaft A and B turrets had a lucky escape according to Leading Seaman Bert Pollard - a kamikaze breaking into pieces from our very accurate A/A fire ffinallycrashed into the sea about 100 feet from the ship's port side dowsing the gun's crew with water and as Bert Pollard intimated, it was a lucky escape but better to be wet than dead.

Altogether with the hundreds of attacks on the fleet and the Australian Squadron, Shropshire was indeed a lucky ship to have survived the kamikaze attacks although not all were recorded in the log. From a stoker's point of view things were just as scary and in some cases more so - they couldn't see, only feel and hear the rumblings and shuddering effects of gunfire and near misses from enemy action.

Well, what do you do says Leading Stoker Max Farrell when sealed off below and the need to visit the heads arises and not the time and place to request permission to leave. Well, if interested, ask him how they solved the problem in the 'B' Boiler room and relate it to the mystery of the 'apple dumplings'. Stoker Vin Cesari, another avid story teller about the unknown workers in the engineering department, also tells it as they survived in those hot and noisy surrounds.

He took over running the evaporators from Max Farrell, which changed salt water into fresh and relates. He thought at the time, the generous offer of a cold drink from Lieutenant-Commander (E) L.N. Dine with ice was a nice gesture. He soon found out the reason, the brine tank leaked into the ice-making containers and 'it tasted bloody awful'.

Also because it was unknown to most of the upper deck crew, Vin Cesari gave a brief run down on the different areas where engineering staff worked eg: Shropshire had two boiler rooms - each with four oil-fired boilers; two engine rooms - each with two steam turbines and other auxiliary machinery such as the evaporators, steam dynamos (light and power); two diesel dynamos - one in sick bay flat - the other on the port side, a deck lower, as well as being responsible for the refrigerating plants. Stoker Cesari did not wish to comment on what happens below if the engine room and boilers were hit during enemy action as his first hand experience in Vampire still had bad memories and of course as ex Canberra stokers had also experienced during the Savo Island battle at Guadalcanal.

Taking it a bit further when all power is lost and the main armament useless the end comes quickly for any fighting ship.

Several days later Captain Nichols announced we were headed for Manila Bay. We refuelled from the oiler Cowaneaque, received 'dry' provisions and embarked fifty smoke pots, then shifted to a cruising disposition after closing up because of enemy aircraft in the vicinity. A second air alert was sounded and a kamikaze crash dived close by and missed a destroyer escort, about two miles dead ahead of us. Shropshire left Lingayen Gulf on 6 February and arrived at the Manila Bay entrance to close up once more because enemy aircraft activity was evident.

Some of our officers left the ship on the 9th for other postings. They were Lieutenant Stock to the Yunnan and Midshipmen Swan and Barnard and Sub-Lieutenant Bear, for the United Kingdom. Ships were constantly on the move in Manila Bay with twenty-five transports including Westralia, Manoora, Kanimbla, entered and left harbour - the battleships Pennsylvania, Mississippi, Colorado and West Virginia left to return to the Pacific Ocean area and Arunta and Warramunga left for anti-submarine patrol duties and to pick up survivors.

Shropshire as flagship of Commodore Farncomb joined company with the cruisers Minneapolis, Portland and US destroyers on 15 February to wait allocation of a target to bombard Corregidor. Rear-Admiral Berkey was our overall Fleet Commander.

Corregidor 15 February 1945
After steaming at 26 knots for ten hours we arrived just off the Bataan Peninsula, some three to four miles from the Island of Corregidor. It was under a heavy aerial bombardment which was reported to have been going on for a week. The enemy guns (one time US) had damaged two destroyers and although fired upon by 6'' gun cruisers, hit by 500 lb and 1000 lb bombs from flights of eighteen Mitchell and Boston bombers and strafed by machinegun fire and rockets escaped damage, the enemy moving back into the tunnels dug into solid rock. The detonation of exploding bombs reverberated all over the bay and the air was laden with huge volumes of dust.

Admiral Berkey instructed our Commodore to move in with his 8'' gun cruiser which should have a greater penetration than the 6'' and other weaponry used. During the afternoon the bombers were still dropping sticks of fire bombs and it was undecided as to whether naval bombardment was necessary. At 1430 the Phoenix came alongside at twenty yard distance from Shropshire and the Captain of Phoenix using his loud hailer, advised us that he had our mail from down under and hoped it was not all official mail. The call raised a loud cheer from those on the upper deck who heard the news which was promulgated to the lower deck by our official broadcaster, Lieutenant Brewster.

Soon after we were ordered to open fire early next morning before the troops landed. The mail came on board, with only a small number of bags containing personal letters. Boston bombers were now dropping parachute anti-personnel bombs which floated down to explode about twenty to thirty feet above ground with a maximum spread of shrapnel. We could see the bombed buildings on top of Corregidor which incidentally rises about 1000 feet vertically from the sea, an imposing target. Our minesweepers were also hard at it, locating and destroying mines. A final bogey report at 1950 kept us at action stations until it was proved friendly.

Next morning, 16 February 1945 at 0715, Shropshire steaming on a course of 090 at 10 knots opened fire with her 8'' guns at Target Roger on the eastern end of Corregidor at a range of 9500 yards bearing 034 degrees with four gun salvoes. The gunnery officer reported to the captain that the first salvo fell just short of the target - two shots on land and two in the sea. The second salvo hit the lower end of the target and a third the upper part of the target area to ricochet over the turtle-back top of the rocky landscape.

The next three salvoes were observed to hit the target and three broadsides were fired to complete the job. After ten minutes of hectic shooting we expended forty-eight rounds of 8'' SAP(K). Target Area Roger consisted of high rocky ground with a 100-foot cliff face and a ledge running along about fifty-sixty feet above sea level - it was apparently a radio station as aerial masts were quite prominent.

'Guns' suggested to the captain we use 8'' SAP shell with full charge, shells set fifty percent delay and fifty percent non-delay. This area neutralisation shoot was proposed because reports had not indicated the complete success by the heavy bombing. We were a little low on 8'' HE but had plenty of SAP and this was the deciding factor. After the bombardment no enemy return fire was observed from the target area. A final report by the captain stated Shropshire had fired 3263 rounds of 8" since her first battle operation in December 1943. She had used SAP, HE and US HC shells.

Whilst this bombardment was short and sweet to our eyes and ears the excitement was not over. The US cruisers were bombarding the jetties and beach areas supported by the destroyers, and mines were being destroyed at regular intervals all over the area. Just before the hundreds of Douglas aircraft troop carriers came over, two more heavy air strikes by Liberators, Bostons and Mitchells were carried out at 0750.

At 0835 paratroopers were dropped by the thousand on Corregidor. The white and multi-coloured chutes indicating different supplies, dotted the island and the cliff face. Some paratroopers missing their target areas were hanging in space from rocky spurs. However, it was reported later that most were rescued. Sad to relate some paratroopers were killed when their chutes failed to open. I personally witnessed several. At 0930 General MacArthur's personal Super Fortress flew over to view the overall results. He was protected by an escort of fighters. Destroyers went in for a final beach bombardment just prior to the seaborne Marines' landing. After this exciting return and recapture of the base he left in 1942, General MacArthur spoke a few words praising the men of all the armed services on a job well done.

One of our PT boats moving in close to Rock Island (lighthouse on top) which is close to Corregidor, received Japanese mortar fire and heavy machine-gun fire but escaped without damage. It requested a destroyer to bombard and destroy the gun emplacement - it was demolished very quickly by the pounding of 5" shells. It was reported that Japanese suicide boats were attacking our ships. While most were destroyed by gunfire, one did come in close and blew up damaging slightly the underwater hull of a destroyer near to us. We waited off Monjoi Island for Arunta to arrive alongside with official mail and then left for Lingayen Gulf to anchor at 0730 on 17 February.

After a few quiet days and only a few reports of bogeys, most turning out to be friendly, we witnessed two monstrous explosions ashore at night which left large fires burning. The captain spoke to the ship's company and announced we would be going home, south. A great cheer from over 1000 sailors went up from all over the ship (1280 to be correct).

Shropshire had previously refuelled from the oiler Chepachet and then provisioned from Merkur. A change of diet was more than welcome as we had been served bully beef three meals a day and most were heartily tired of this type of 'scran' and even the canteen was running short of palatable food.

On Monday the 19th we washed the ship's side in preparation for painting which was completed on the 20th. Two RN Assault ships, accompanied by the USS Rocky Mount CTG 78.1 with Rear-Admiral Royal aboard, proceeded to sea.

After suffering three days of air alerts and closing up at action stations, a host of small happenings occurred before we actually left for Leyte Gulf on our way south. 'Guns' lost his binoculars on 23 February, an American photographer steadying himself on the bow guard-rails photographed most of the ship's company with caps on and caps off on the 24th - the caps off picture was the easier of the two to locate one's own face. Boise and Phoenix arrived to disgorge a huge amount of mail and parcels and finally, at 2100 on 26 February 1945, Shropshire went to sea on her homeward journey proceeding at 16 knots and accompanied by Portland, Minneapolis and an escorting destroyer screen.

The captain told us we would arrive at Leyte on 1 March, Seeadler Harbour on the 5th to exercise with Hobart before leaving on the 10th to arrive in Sydney on the 16th. During the Leyte Gulf and Lingayen Gulf actions we received some well-earned praise from various sources and, in the main relating to our gunnery and radar prowess.

Rear-Admiral Weyler USN (battleship's commander) 'Well Done'.

Commander Task Group Aircraft Carriers CTG 77.4 'That was an excellent job of tracking and reporting - Well Done.'

Aircraft Carriers CVE CTG 77.4 'Your fighter direction work on 3 and 4 was excellent. Keep it up.'

HMAS Australia asked 'any damage' replied - 'No thank you - much smoke and bits of aircraft.'

USS Bennion (fighter director destroyer) 'Good work on your part we were able to intercept them; they showed bogeys to us also.'

Force FD (fighter direction) to Bennion: 'Shropshire did a good job of tracking those F6Fs and we were able to effect interception right out; we didn't have them. We worked well together today, there weren't many bogeys. Shropshire fired on one of the three Black Widows, they just seemed to come over and wander around. We were unable to contact them and they are no use that way.

Rear-Admiral Weyler USN (battleship's commander) 'Porthole reports' Force Fido appears reluctant to credit her bogey reports. My experience Leyte Gulf Porthole's radar telling and early warning excellent. Weyler.

HMAS Australia (after being hit a few times) 'Glad to be near you. Hope we don't bring the flies.'

Com Air 7th Fleet (seaplane tender) (We stopped a shore battery firing on the US seaplanes moored to them near the Tender) 'Thank you very much.'

To Tulagi from CTG 77.4 'Listen well for Porthole's radar reports. He is hot stuff' his reports are good; he has good Jeep radar equipment.'

Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser 'I have had the opportunity of learning at first hand of the performance of HMA ships during the last few days and I am proud of the Royal Australian Navy. All their work was first class.'

During the month of February 1945 Commodore Farncomb again brought to the attention of the Australian Naval Board the unsatisfactory feature of poor mail service to Australian ships. During actions the problems were acceptable but on completion of said actions and the situation of many weeks of mailless days it was natural that feelings were aggravated by the lack of proper facilities and an inefficient organisation.

Shortly after this report Arunta came alongside on 27 February to deliver some mail and whilst those lucky enough to be reading their epistles on the upper deck others not so lucky had the pleasure of watching the Minneapolis launch its aircraft from its after catapult - the launching and retrieval of aircraft never failed to gain an audience. The recovery of the aircraft was much easier although a little rough as it landed on the sea to be lifted aboard by crane. Portland also entertained us as she catapulted her aircraft twice on the 28th to check out the credentials of one of our hospital ships.

Shropshire arrived at Manus on 5 March after disembarking 8'' and other ammunition and embarking our own mail from an LST; Warramunga came alongside for repairs to minor defects. Arunta and Yunnan left for San Pedro Bay; Yunnan earlier embarked our torpedoes and depth charges before we left for Lingayen Gulf as we were to have our two quadruple torpedo tubes removed. This was to improve our top weight disposition and lower our centre of gravity and as we were southbound we took on board these torpedoes and depth charges for return to Sydney. The damaged battleship Washington, entered and docked in Seeadler for repairs.

Commodore Farncomb was preparing to move his staff to Hobart temporarily. Hobart had arrived earlier for exercises having been out of action (hit by a torpedo) from 20 July 1943 until she arrived in Manus on 15 February 1945 to take over as the Australian Flagship. The commodore struck his broad pendant in Shropshire on 7 March 1945.

Units of the British Pacific Fleet (two battleships, four carriers, cruisers and destroyers) with Vice-Admiral Rawlings flying his flag in the battleship King George V followed by eight (8) large tankers entered harbour. One never tires of watching the comings and goings of ships especially the rare sight of battle- ships entering and leaving harbour.

A few of us went on board the King George V as a working party, and were more than pleased to return to Shropshire after observing the style of living the RN sailors were 'enjoying'. Apart from being refused the use of the accommodation ladder and made to struggle up the boom, the ship was smelly and grubby. We sailed from Seeadler Harbour in company with Hobart, Arunta and Warramunga for torpedo firing exercises as well as a night encounter exercise to help Hobart work up its crew.

We undertook further underway exercises on 10 March with Hobart, Warramunga and Arunta with Hobart carrying out mainly throw-off firings with her main (6'') and secondary (4'') armament. On completion of the exercises we left with Arunta at 1500 for Sydney steaming at 16 knots. Hobart and Warramunga sailed for Leyte, San Pedro Bay to join Phoenix and other US ships to carry out bombardment and other search and destroy missions as required. On Sunday 11 during the forenoon we passed Cape Gloucester, Shropshire's first taste of action as an Australian warship, and then passed Finschhafen, a well-known AIF battleground, as we steamed through heavy rain.

Shropshire refuelled at 0830, starboard side on 12 March at a reduced speed of eight knots where we again witnessed another hair-raising exercise as we rolled towards and away from one another, with fuel lines hanging like entrails, but our crane driver ever watchful and our engine room staff working hard to avoid entanglements. When it was over we increased speed to 17 knots to pass through the China Straits to run into one of the worst storms encountered for some time. The 1/2" bolts holding down the foc'sle blast shield on our most for'd Bofor were ripped off like cheese as the waves crashed over the bows. The weather improved and Captain Nichols gave a brief outline of leave arrangements and then announced that US President Roosevelt had died and that Harry Truman was to be the next US President.

We sighted the Australian coastline on the 15th, our first sight for nearly a year and to everyone's dismay the ship slowed speed to 12 knots as we were several hours ahead of schedule. We arrived off Sydney Heads at 0615 on 16 March and entered at 0800 (with the band playing on the quarterdeck) to secure to No. 2 buoy.

Whilst long leave liberty men were being piped, preparations, were well in hand for Shropshire and Arunta to be dry docked. On 17 March 1945 we proceeded to de-ammunition ship. It was a hard job but had to be carried out because it is well known that dockyard workers refuse to work on a fully armed warship unless they received danger money.

On a lighter vein Mr W.G. Macadam, gunner, joined Shropshire on 17 March and soon settled in. His arrival marked several changes to the ship's company during the next few weeks. Commanders J.S. Mesley (N) joined on the 23rd (I became his yeoman) and Lieutenant-Commander Gellatly left. Commander J.C. Morrow, our new executive officer, joined on 17 April and Commander G.C. Oldham left on 16 May. Commander (S) W.R.J. Hatherall departed on 23rd; Lieutenant-Commander Marks joined on 30 April as our new 'Guns' and on 8 May Lieutenant-Commander Bracegirdle left; Lieutenant Hardiman also left on 15 May.

Of all the senior officers leaving Shropshire, Warwick Bracegirdle was the best known and I suppose, to be a little sentimental, best loved - he was surely missed as a man's man and a tough, but fair officer. Lieutenant Hardiman never forgetting his Lower Deck training similarly exhibited these qualities.

The return to Sydney quickly turned to anger when, after nearly a year away and secured alongside Garden Island ready for leave, we were to witness the efforts of the dockyard police to hold us back to allow the dockyard workers to board the ferry for Circular Quay first. The ferry had not arrived and the weight of the angry sailors kept moving to push these 'usurpers' into the 'drink'. (Unfortunately some of the sailors went in as well.) During our stay in Sydney the dockyard workers went on strike and declared the ship black. They had been reported for lighting fires between decks to boil their billy tea and for being lazy and slow in carrying out their daily work. (So much for being paid danger money for working on a warship.)

On this particular day 1300 men walked off the ship, after a supposed day's work. A quick check through the decks revealed very few (about 100) were actually seen to be on the job. In fact constant smokos seemed to be the order of the day. The upshot of the black ban was we returned north with much of our equipment still requiring urgent maintenance.

Other activities were the very necessary fumigation of the ship before leaving the dry dock, flooding the dock on 10 May, and then securing alongside the cruiser wharfs. Reports were filtering back about further reactions and problems associated with the men on the leave train from Sydney to Melbourne.
The exuberance of some sailors (all ranks) was not well received by RTO; a good crowd farewelled 'Guns' Bracegirdle as he went over the side whilst we were in dry dock. In fact, very few officers failed to be farewelled by fellow officers as well as other ranks.

A general assessment of the ship's company was and still is: 'as a whole, the crew were a happy, well contented and proud bunch'. On 15 May we ammunitioned ship and witnessed some very strong men such as CPO Otto Smith and AB Arthur Crane man-handling 8'' shells weighing 256 lb like feathers, while most of us had trouble with the 4'' weighing 100 lb.

After fuelling we sailed for Jervis Bay for test firing of all our guns 8'', 4'' and CRW (close range weapons). We anchored in the bay on 19 May. On the 22nd we carried out some working up and sea exercises and carried out 8'' firing for radar calibrations off Jervis Bay.

The ship returned to Sydney on 31 May and on 1 June stored, ammunitioned, and refuelled in preparation for our next battle tour. Saturday 2 June was our last shore leave with many a hung-over sailor not anxious to experience the open sea swell expected the following morning. Before concluding this chapter a few stories and incidents are worth repeating. Firstly - another 'do you remember' story was told by Bob Boyd (Able Seaman) one of our collators of stories, and still is to this day.

'Talking about sailing':
Do you remember back in 1944 at Manus, Chief Petty Officer Joe Beverly formed a sailing crew for our cutter. Well.... This particular afternoon a group of us were lazing away down Seeadler Harbour, when the wind dropped and we were becalmed. As we set there a Liberty ship appeared and as she drew closer one of our crew said, 'Chief, that ship is heading straight for us!' 'Don't worry lad', said Joe, 'steam gives way to sail'. After a while the sailor said, pointing to the still approaching ship, 'Chief, I wonder if they know that?' Couple of minutes later even Joe was convinced. 'The bastard's going to run us down lads. Get ready to jump!' 'But Chief', came the cry from Jackie Pelham, 'I can't swim!' 'You'll never get a better chance to learn', said Joe. 'Jump!' A few second later, all had surfaced and out in front and gaining at every stroke was Jackie! 'I wonder what happened to the cutter and the resulting committee of Inquiry'?

Secondly - we enjoyed another ship's dance at the Grace Brothers auditorium before leaving. Captain Nichols was in attendance. The whole show including all food and beverages was paid for by the arbitrary five percent of profits taken from purchases at our ship's canteen. Just as a point of interest most of us found it strange that uniformed civilians were able to operate a private profit making canteen on board a warship. However, they were part of our damage control team during action stations and participated in the several 'For Exercise Only' in various parts of the ship.

Thirdly - Captain Nichols being the sort of man he was, cleared lower deck to give a brief but poignant few words to those still on board about the awards gained by Shropshire, its officers and other ranks.

He congratulated those present who received the awards but still reminded the crew that in most cases the awards were given for the ship's role in the South West Pacific and the men who wore these crosses and medals were in effect given the honour of wearing them on behalf of the ship's company.

This brief comment came about because one of the ship's company whilst ashore talked to one of Australia's more sensational papers and told how he 'won' his award. This the captain considered unwise and should be avoided at all cost. Because the ship was given sixty-four awards during its four battle tours, and there could be only sixty-four recipients, the captain mentioned it was a pity the RAN had not initiated a 'Ship's Citation' as the United States Navy did for their ships. In most cases it was impossible to do a deed of individual bravery. Most considered this a fair comment - 'A Ship's Citation'.